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The dawning of the twenty-first century and genesis of a new millennium has
been extremely kind to technological advance. Industries and society alike have reaped
the extreme benefits of technology at its finest. Technological progress has also proven
to be extraordinarily beneficial to businesses and their bottom lines when properly
employed. The need for automated business logic and functionality has spawned
numerous concepts and efforts to capitalize on advanced business requirements.
Probably the most popular and revolutionary to date of all initiatives is the advent of
eBusiness. A direct descendant of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), eBusiness has
and continues to evolve into more than a phenomenon, but rather a sound component
of successful corporations and organizations.
The evolution and acceptance of eBusiness has created a ripple effect
throughout the technical and business worlds. The promise of this wonderful concept
and its accompanying technology has forced companies to completely rethink strategic
planning efforts, and to sit up and pay full attention to this ever-growing development.
One area that has been extremely affected by the wide spread acceptance of
eBusiness and its counterparts are the architectures and infrastructures now utilized to
support these efforts. Enterprise architectures that had originally been designed to
shield internal business activities from the public eye of the Internet and other domains
have been either replaced, redesigned, or melded with new architectural designs that
proclaim companies and their offerings to the world, all in a digital atmosphere. This
proclamation can be exceptionally lucrative and damaging, all at the same time.
The conception of the Internet has without a doubt been the single most
important episode in the continuing fairytale and illumination of technological advance.
What once was considered the Underground Railroad of information; limited to
universities, research groups, and government organizations has become the Autobahn
of electronic data, and continues to evolve and transcend barriers and boundaries. The
ability to surpass traditional barriers such as geography and distance serves as a
definite attraction for organizations to eBusiness, and a tremendous amount of
companies are acting upon this attraction.
However, the dark side of the Internet is a playground for adversaries such as,
but not limited to hackers (crackers), lone criminals, malicious insiders (disgruntled
employees), industrial spies, media representatives, organized crime, terrorists, national
intelligence organizations, special interest groups, competitors, script kiddies, and
info-
warriors to name a few. All of these can and should be considered a potential danger
while individuals and organizations alike interact via the Internet and private networks
as well. Nowhere are the aforementioned dangers as prevalent as they are in the
increasingly popular world of e. eBusiness, eCommerce, eMarketPlaces, eAuctions,
eSupplyChains, etc., etc.; the list goes on and on.
The digitization of data is big business, and organizations are realizing the infinite
potential involved with participating in these markets,
as well as utilizing it to streamline
day-to-day business operations and management. Around the globe scores of
innovative, thought-provoking systems are deployed daily to feed upon the e landscape
and take advantage of this new and exciting world of prosperity. However, the same
factions that make haste to establish an Internet or web-based presence and rush to
take advantage of digital data and goods are often the very ones that almost always
either forget, simply neglect, or place a low priority on an absolute vital necessity of all
e-efforts. Security!
Therefore, the intent of this thesis is to examine and introduce methodical
approaches to designing and implementing security life cycles that are driven by policy
for secure eBusiness architectures. In order to provide the necessary assurance and
security needed for eBusiness architectures efficient well thought out life cycles must be
employed for security practices. Security, like any other component of Information
Technology (IT) is not a hit or miss scenario. It is a continuos and meticulous process
that is all encompassing of all veins of an enterprise. In order to design a secure
architecture a procedural approach must be taken, so that all threats, vulnerabilities,
adversaries, holes, nooks, and crannies are covered. Even after all these things have
been addressed there is no such thing as an impenetrable system or infrastructure,
especially in a networked environment. Given enough time and resources the strongest
of confines can be made as vulnerable as a home PC connected to the Net. This is
especially true for those systems that operate over public networks such as the Internet.
Therefore, processes and procedures must be introduced, refined and constantly
managed to maintain a secure state of operation.
This text will illustrate the process of assessing technical environments utilized
for eBusiness initiatives and gathering requirements for secure operation. Then taking
those requirements and developing a functional security policy to govern over the
system. Next, the document will discuss extracting requirements from the actual
security policy and using them to create a plan of implementation. Also, during the
implementation phase exists several testing and assurance activities that should be
addressed. After, the overall implementation is completed and deployed, streamlined
processes must be applied and properly managed to ensure that the hardened solution
continues to function, as it should. An adequate cycle is much more intensive than
described above, and this thesis will provide the detail needed to thoroughly address
the concepts described here.
Background
As an increasing number of traditionally brick-n-mortar corporations embark upon
eBusiness initiatives, there exists a need to restructure and extend their respective
infrastructures to be well positioned to compete in the New Economy. The vital
requirement of incorporating security measures is often secondary or completely
overlooked. The media broadcasts daily the rise in cybercrimes, unauthorized
intrusions, and illicit behavior on the web. However, in the highly publicized networked
world of the Internet, most organizations feel that just being a major on-line player in
their market segment is much more important than fielding reliable, secure, trustworthy
systems for consumers, suppliers, and partners to interact with.
Ensuring secure transactions and interactions requires a meticulous, methodical
approach that must be followed by all parties involved. This is especially true for
organizations and individuals that conduct business electronically. Security is most
definitely a needed component of efficient eBusiness architectures, and without it there
are certain consequences to pay.
Additionally, as eBusiness becomes more of a mainstream factor those who
chose to ignore the security issues involved or inadequately address them will begin to
feel not only the expected repercussions of delays, downtimes, and the like, but more
financial pinches as well in the form judicial review. This further solidifies the fact that
security for eBusiness must become an integrated component of all that wish to have
dealings in the networked world or pay the ever-increasing price of incompetence.
"Everyone knows that security is vital to eCommerce success. What they often
don't know is that security is more than erecting physical and electronic barriers. The
strongest encryption and most robust firewall are practically worthless without a security
policy that articulates how these tools are to be used. A security policy concerns risk. It
is high-level and technology neutral. Its purpose is to set directions and procedures, and
to define penalties and countermeasures for
noncompliance." 1
Often many organizations recognize the importance of implementing a security
policy and actively regulating the abidance of its decrees. However, within the
ever-
changing world of technology and more specifically within eBusiness simply creating,
implementing, and attempting to enforce a corporate security policy is not adequate
enough. In order to operate within eBusiness domains strict corporate security rules will
be broken. Therefore, it is necessary to construct eBusiness architectures on the
grounds and principles of specialized security policies that adhere to the diverse needs
of the Internet and business conducted over public networks. These security policies
for eBusiness though specialized still carry on the traits of traditional policies, as the
foundations of security are the same, but it is the approaches and means that differ
greatly.
The design, implementation, and management of eBusiness security
architectures should begin with the security policy and start its fruition from there.
However, simply creating a security policy is certainly not adequate for the assorted
realms of eBusiness. To effectively construct secure eBusiness architectures from a
policy driven approach a systematic, framework or life cycle must be implemented. A
proper life cycle will provide an organization with the direction to gather appropriate
requirements for an efficient security policy, provide instructions on extracting additional
requirements from the policy for implementation, give guidance on effectively testing the
implementation, incorporate operational procedures, supply management instructions,
and various other details. The life cycle for security like others is a continuos process
and meticulous approach that will provide assurance and means to assess the
assurance of security architectures. Many security life cycles already exist and are
adequate for eBusiness environments, as well. However, many corporations in their
frantic pace to participate in eCommerce and the like simply neglect to research, tailor,
and implement these life cycles. This document will present and examine several
enterprise security frameworks that exist within the computing and other industries.
Although, all of the frameworks that will be introduced are formidable options for
eBusinesses no one approach will be a perfect fit for all environments, for every
infrastructure will differ and possess unique security requirements. So, it is certainly
feasible that organizations would utilize differing frameworks and possibly combinations
of many, tailored to fit a specific environment and its security needs.
'The basic requirements for eCommerce security include information
confidentiality, authentication, authorization, data integrity, non-repudiation and
availability. Given the dynamic environment of eCommerce, effectively meeting these
requirements is not straightforward. The challenge is to come up with the most
technically and economically feasible plan for protecting eCommerce activities, knowing
that today's most secure technology will be vulnerable tomorrow.
As is the case for most systems problems, the best approach is a structured one,
including analyzing risk and delegating resources to protect the most valued assets of
the organization. Typically, policies are put into place to manage risk. The problem with
current approaches is that none address the problem of keeping up with the increasing
rate of change in eCommerce technology and applications nor do they consider how to
keep such policies consistent and aligned with organizational
objectives." 1
The above comments solidify the need for companies to embrace a more
structured strategy and approach for security. This need is of an even more dire nature
when discussing eBusiness security, as it is inherently less secure and more difficult to
secure. Organizations must consider the security of eBusiness systems and
infrastructures a programmatic endeavor that extends far beyond the simple
implementation of products and technologies. It should be an effort that is adequately
staffed, managed, and funded in order to realize success.
The following sections will introduce steps of a security framework and life cycle
approach driven by policy. It is important to remember that the examples are just that,
examples and may not be the perfect fit for an individual organization. However, the
underlying principles that will be illustrated are an absolute must and should be included
in any framework for security. To neglect or overlook any of these principles would
almost certainly create vulnerabilities and possibly facilitate security breaches.
Therefore, it is recommended that even if the following frameworks and life cycles are
not appropriate for a certain environment that the concepts presented not be
abandoned as they represent sound foundations for security.
1
Policy Framework for Interpreting Risk in eCommerce Security
Jewels & Desires
Assets
"As organizations rush to build and support eCommerce applications there is an
increasing realization that information and financial assets are becoming more
vulnerable to attack. Media hyped reports of the
"BubbleBoy"
virus and frequent network
failure of eCommerce sites like eTrade may serve to alarm the public, but the threats
are real and the potential risks catastrophic. One industry survey discovered that
organizations engaged in Web commerce, electronic supply chains, and enterprise
resource planning experience three times the incidents of information loss and theft of
trade secrets than everybody
else." 1
Organizations that participate in commerce and business activities have always
been faced with the requirement of providing protection for assets involved. The same
holds true for extensions of traditional business strategies such as eBusiness,
regardless of the format. Yes, even in this so called New Economy corporations are
forced to carefully evaluate and assess the value of data and digital goods, then take
appropriate measures of security and assurance to protect those possessions.
However, as enterprises have consistently embarked upon eBusiness endeavors they
have routinely forgotten, neglected, or simply failed in applying adequate security for
systems and architectures involved in eCommerce dealings. The importance of asset
management is reflected in the following comments.
"What are your company's crown jewels and where do these critical assets
reside? They may be private customer records, sales information, employee files or
transaction records, proprietary pricing, formulas or recipes, and knowledge.
"I've been told by ClOs that very often, there is not enough appreciation for the crown
jewels of the
company,"
Tritak says. "As a result there is a tendency in some institutions
to seek some sort of uniform level of security across the entire organization, which may
not be adequate for the real security of high-end critical assets. You may be
oversecuring some assets and undersecuring
others."
What are the IT assets that enable you to deliver products and services for your
company? As companies increasingly depend on technology to deliver and store their
crown jewels, the potential for theft or damage increases. Assigning a value to these
mission-critical IT assets helps senior managers understand the value of IT to their
success." 6
It is extremely important for all enterprises
and individuals creating architectures
to fully know and understand the magnitude, structure, location, accessibility,
vulnerability, threats, risks, and any other possible
information pertaining to property in
an eBusiness environment. For it is not until a company truly understands what must
be protected that it can accurately address ensuring the security
of those assets.
Understanding the assets that exist within eBusiness
architectures is key to security
1
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professionals employed by corporations trying to securely enable eCommerce efforts.
Proper evaluation of assets will reveal alternatives to dealing with security requirements,
as the value of individual assets will differentiate, as will the effort that needs to be
exerted. Thus, different assets require different security tactics to safely operate,
depending on the business needs of the corporation and other stakeholders involved in
eBusiness initiatives.
As the above text points out, supplying appropriate security for the protection of
eBusiness assets is by no means a one size or solution fits all scenario. The
alternatives that exist for protecting assets in an eBusiness environment are inherently
present because, within individual enterprises participating in these situations there
exists many flavors of assets, as well as many approaches to securing them.
Therefore, providing appropriate, adequate security must be carefully examined, as
security itself can take many shapes and forms. Selecting the correct format is a direct
derivative of business needs and assets that are essential to those needs.
Considering that there are numerous forms of security that can be applied to
different initiatives it is extremely important for organizations to understand their exact
need before implementing security measures. Physical security, Operational Security
(OPSEC), Internet security, network security, application security, Information Security
(INFOSEC), and employee security among others are all entities of the vast area of
security that companies must eventually address. Although, all of the aforementioned
fields are definitely important, some may or may not be appropriate for designing secure
eBusiness architectures that can efficiently protect an organization's assets. In many
instances companies have already addressed the majority of these issues and selected
the necessary components to protect corporate assets that are involved in traditional
business activities. However, these selections must be thoroughly revisited when
entering into eBusiness transactions, for these efforts will be accompanied by a slew of
totally new requirements that must be accommodated, in addition to traditional business
requirements that still exist.
Proper reconnaissance of enterprise's valued assets is an absolute necessity in
attempting to secure an organization's eBusiness activities. Although, when assets are
introduced into the digital economy new, innovative measures must be pursued in order
to construct strong architectures to protect them, becoming familiar with and
documenting the business needs and behaviors of those assets is still the first step in
providing assurance and protection of assets. Neglecting to seriously address this initial
step in the design of security architectures could and has in past situations proven to be
extremely detrimental. Companies must understand where the true value of their
eBusiness resides. Whether it be in customer databases, operational business logic,
corporate proprietary data, or marketing data for eBusiness all must be protected, but
those data considered to be the crown jewels of not only the corporation but quite
possibly the entire industry must be secured by all means. Effectively protecting those
assets considered valuable to both an organization and its adversaries will aid in further
defining threats and risks to those assets, which will further clarify the needs of security
architectures and provide for more adequate designs.
The following questions and comments should certainly cause organizations to
evaluate and reevaluate corporate assets and determine their value and effective
means to protect them.
'Think about what you could do if you were privy to, say, your competitor's
business plan for the upcoming year. What if you knew what his marketing budget was,
how he was spending it, and what his product specifications looked like? And what if
your competitors got their hands on that same information about you?When information
is one of your most valuable assets, you must work to ensure that it goes only to whom
you want it to go, when you want it to, and in the format you desire. Organizations of all
shapes and sizes are working overtime to understand these issues: What's encryption,
and how does it help? Is that packet-level or at the application layer? Do I need public-
key infrastructure, and if so, how do I implement it?
Before getting involved in implementation-specific questions such as these, the
first thing anyone focusing on security should do is develop a cohesive security policy.
Such a policy sets overarching principle s that drive all security-related decisions; it is
the set of rules and practices governing how organizations manage, protect, and
distribute sensitive information. Your security policy should be published, distributed,
discussed, and promoted throughout the organization.
Before developing an effective security policy, conduct a thorough risk analysis:
What's the value of different classes of information to your organization? What's the
value of this same information outside your organization? How costly would it be it if it
fell into a competitor's hands? Finally, how much will it cost to secure the information?
Your policy should include rules about what physical security measures are required for
different types of information or data, and under what circumstances. Generally
speaking, the cost of protecting the information shouldn't exceed its value to you or your
organization." 2
The above statements illustrate some possible hazards of not effectively securing
assets. In this the age of information data such as marketing and business plans,
product specifications, corporate spending reports, acquisition strategies, and so on are
even more valuable than cash on hand. Therefore, the protection of all assets,
especially those that are key to business operations is essential to success as this
section has attempted to emphasize. Additionally, for the business activities of today,
especially in eBusiness assets transcend the traditional capital items
of industry and
requires much more attention and consideration. The comments below are a testament
to the financial risks associated with security breaches and the theft of data. As the
author points out these numbers are at an all time high and continue to increase at an
alarming rate. What is probably even scarier than the
numbers obtained from the
survey is the fact that the situation is evidently getting
worst and there is no sign of
absolute fortitude in sight.
2
Security 101
"According to results of the sixth-annual Computer Crime and Security Survey,
released today, intellectual property theft and security breaches are on the rise while the
costs of those intrusions are skyrocketing.
Conducted by the Computer Security Institute of San Francisco and the FBI, the
survey of 538 security administrators from industry, government and academia shows
that 85% of respondents reported security breaches in this year's survey, and 26%
reported intellectual property theft, up from 20% in 2000.
But the survey also shows that the cost of that theft is exploding. While only 34
respondents could quantify the financial losses associated with intellectual property
theft, that number added up to more than $151 million. The amount is up from almost
$67 million in 2000 and $20 million in 1997. In total, 186 respondents said losses from
all types of security breaches cost more than $377 million. That means theft of
intellectual property accounts for 40% of all losses tabulated in the survey, despite the
fact that such a small number of companies could quantify
it." 3
Once again these figures are astounding to say the least, but despite the obvious
repercussions companies are still eagerly venturing into eBusiness domains and
neglecting to accurately take measures to secure these activities. Although, the
possible gains usually outweigh the associated risks this certainly does not justify
negligence on the part of eBusinesses, which increases the risk for consumers who
utilize their systems.
eBusiness Needs & Requirements
[The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) and the FBI say they've
identified several European-based organized cracker groups, mostly in Russia and
Ukraine, who are systematically exploiting known vulnerabilities in U.S. e-commerce
and e-financeWeb sites to steal proprietary data, customer databases and credit card
information. To date, officials say more than 1 million credit card numbers have been
stolen.
"Despite previous advisories, many computer owners have not patched their
systems, allowing these kinds of attacks to continue and prompting this updated release
of
information,"
says the FBI in a statement.
Federal investigators say they've been tracking the series of concerted hacks for
several months, and even issued an advisory last December warning companies of the
threat posed by international cracker gangs. Despite the warnings, government officials
have not seen any abatement in hacker activity.
"Since the last advisory was published, the FBI has continued to observer hacker
activity targeting victims associated with e-commerce or e-finance/banking
businesses,"
reads a NIPC statement. "In many cases, the hacker activity had been ongoing for
several months before the victim became aware of the
intrusion."
Cost of Computer Crime Exploding, Survey Says
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The vectors being exploited by foreign crackers included, Unauthorized
Access to IIS Servers through Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) Data
Access with Remote Data Services; SQL Query Abuse Vulnerability; Registry
Permissions Vulnerabilities and Web Server File Request Parsing. Some of these
vulnerabilities were first discovered and patches were made available more than two
years ago.
"This is another example of poor maintenance by lazy organizations and system
administrators, which has resulted in these sites being exploited presumably by an
organized gang of
criminals,"
says Dave Kennedy, director of research services for
TruSecure Corp., a security services firm and publisher of Security Wire Digest. "We
have been warned by CERT and by many experts in the field, who have repeatedly
warned that exploitation of known vulnerabilities is one of the biggest
problems."
Since the FBI began tracking these cracking incidents, investigators have
identified 40 U.S. companies that have fallen victim to these groups, who usually
demand compensation for patching the security holes and the safe return of stolen data.
Investigators say the
groups'
modus operendi is to compromise a system, steal
information and then contact the victim. The groups have made thinly veiled extortion
threats offering protection to their victims from other hackers. The messages become
more threatening if the victim doesn't cooperate, investigators say. Officials also believe
the crackers are selling credit card information to organized crime groups.
"There has been evidence that the stolen information is at risk whether or not the
victim cooperates with the demands of the
intruder,"
FBI officials say.
While this isn't the first time the FBI and NIPC have issued warning about
computer crimes and threats, observers say the advisory goes beyond any previous
communique. Some say the candor of the
investigators'
statement shows that the
government realizes it needs to encourage the private sector to take preventive
measures against hackers.
"They are taking this unprecedented step of announcing before the investigation
is
complete,"
says Doug Sabo, VP of infosec for the Information Technology Association
of America (ITAA). "Law enforcement is awakening to the notion that it has to work with
industry in investigating and battling cybercrime."]
4
Business needs and requirements for successful operation exist within every
enterprise. Whether they be establishing accessibility to Intranets for customers,
creating Extranets for partners and suppliers, setting up
remote access for sales teams,
etc. business needs are certainly a driving factor when considering possible constraints
that must be applied to protect eBusiness architectures. However, facilitating business
needs should by no means compromise the security and assurance
of a corporation's
eBusiness, as the security alert above indicates.
FBI Says Russian Crackers are Targeting U.S. E-Commerce Sites
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The above alert notice is a glimpse into a serious problem that exists among
eBusiness participants. The haste being made to cash in on the eCommerce revolution
has caused companies to thoroughly evaluate and enable eBusiness needs and
requirements by any means necessary and almost always overlooking or neglecting
security concerns, which are always present. An example of this is the fact that so
many organizations have simply ignored previous FBI warnings and failed to apply
necessary security patches primarily because it would have some effect on their current
on-line initiatives. Now this negligence has come back to bite them!
The discovery and enabling of eBusiness needs is a vital part of a company's
assessment of securing eBusiness architectures, as facilitating these needs is key to
success. On the other hand to have these requirements undermined by a lack of
concern or actions to guarantee security can be devastating to not only all eBusiness
activities, but also a corporation in general. eBusiness needs should include adequate
security and the securing of eBusiness infrastructures should not be sidelined to
address other requirements.
Security has begun to be considered a nuisance instead of an enabler of
eBusiness, as the following comments suggest. "Excessive security is holding back
eCommerce, according to the security arm of a firm which not so long ago became
center of a high profile security breach itself. Evidian, a subsidiary of Group Bull, has
completed a survey of 40 blue chip companies and found that two in five of them think
complicated security is "the most irritating aspect of conducting business online".
There's some truth in Evidian's conclusion that you can go overboard with
security and make systems too hard to use. Security should be implemented so that it
doesn't impose itself on users, who being human beings will work out ways around
security checks if they become too
irritating." 5
The above comments subscribe to a thought process that there is such a thing
as too much security, in which interfaces to systems become daunting and difficult to
use. However, a system or infrastructure can never be too secure! If an organization's
security practices have begun to restrict usability
and functionality of systems, it is not
that too much security is applied, but rather that the security
in place has been
improperly designed, implemented, and administered. Considering the importance and
overall investments being made towards eBusiness within enterprises one would
think
that securing those investments would be
an ever-growing concern and adequately
compensated for. However, as stated earlier the mad dash to eCommerce treasures
has blinded most organizations to the obstacles and potential risks in embracing this
paradigm. Additionally, the comments below further substantiate that companies are
not placing security concerns at the top of
their priority lists.
"ClOs'
jobs have been made even more difficult as most corporations trampled
past security issues in the mad rush to
mine e-commerce gold. In the CIO-100 survey, a
mere 9 percent of the respondents reported security as the number-one
technology-
5
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related issue on which their company was currently focused. More than half of
businesses worldwide spend 5 percent or less of their IT budget securing their
networks, according to a recent study by Datamonitor. More than 30 percent have yet to
even implement adequate
security." 6
Knowing and understanding the eBusiness needs of an enterprise is definitely
essential in determining appropriate security measures for eBusiness architectures. For
in truly understanding the requirements for the operation of an eBusiness, as well as the
goals attempting to be accomplished the appropriate application of adequate security
will serve as an aid in these endeavors and not a hindrance. Every corporation's needs
and requirements will differ as each is unique and approaches eBusiness in similar, but
different ways. Therefore, these needs and requirements should be spelled out early,
as to serve as a reminder of the functionality that must not be degraded. When
establishing the essentials of operation certain tradeoffs are inevitable, but addressing
these possible substitutions for security and other requirements early in the life cycle
allows organizations to determine which initiatives are more important than others and
which can be sacrificed.
Having total awareness and understanding of the importance of both an
enterprises assets and the necessary business needs to make those assets profitable in
an eBusiness environment is an extraordinarily vital component of any security
framework or life cycle being implemented for security concerns and issues. Without
taking these necessary precautions organizations have already started down the wrong
path in exploring possible security solutions. The evaluation of assets, eBusiness
needs and requirements should all be conducted within the initial phase of any security
life cycle or framework, as to gain an in-depth perspective of what lies ahead. The
following sections will delve deeper into the concept of security life cycles and
frameworks and will evaluate several examples that have been created by entities with
the security field as well as other industries. The frameworks
will further validate that an
organized, well thought out, continual process for addressing security solutions is the
only way to attack the never ending saga of creating
eBusiness security architectures,
and that they must base their foundation on adequate, living security policies.
12 Keys for Locking Up Tight
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Assessing the Problem
[In today's marketplace, businesses must transform to e-businesses to remain
competitive. Analysts predict that companies that don't make the necessary changes
will be overrun by competition and ultimately fail. As enterprises around the world
undergo transformations, they are leveraging Internet technologies to:
Broaden their markets by extending their reach globally
Enter new business areas through collaborations or expanded services made possible
with Web-based interactions
Increase employee productivity by providing easier access to corporate information
and services
Reduce costs through improved operations that integrateWeb access and traditional
information technology (IT) systems
Increasingly, companies realize the significant business value of developing and
deploying enterprise-wide security to the rapid growth of e-business. To deliver high
availability and easy manageability, they must consider security requirements as an
important part of their e-business transformation. Mario Kosanovich, META Group's
program director of Service Management Strategies and Global Network Strategies,
asserts: "IT organizations can no longer view security as a burden. Rather, security
must be viewed as an enabler, and security policies must become an integral part of IT
as businesses continue to expose themselves and collaborate with key partners,
customers and employees."]
The transformation mentioned above is one that literally thousands of enterprises
have embarked upon and multitudes are continuously following suit. The problem that
exists among the majority of these transformations is that they are constantly conducted
without proper preparation and analysis. This reformation of traditional business and
the increased usage of electronic mediums have necessitated the need for exhaustive
strategies in approaching eBusiness and securing the architectures that it is run on.
This section will introduce and examine several different approaches to
establishing and managing a life cycle for security.
Although the life cycle will be
discussed in its entirety this section will focus on what should be the
initial phase of any
formidable model. The assessment phase encompasses a wide variety of areas and
introduces extremely vital concepts and information to be used
throughout the life span
of a security framework. The assessment phase
could quite easily be considered the
most important stage in the life cycle for an organization, but that assumption is totally
dependant on the enterprise, for one company might be entering into a framework from
scratch and is more dependant on the assessment phase. While another company
7
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might already have a functional security model in place that requires changes, thus not
needing to enter into the assessment phase from the absolute beginning. As was
stated earlier security needs for eBusinesses vary because each has unique
requirements that must be addressed in accordance to the particular organization.







Figure 1;%m.E& Lift CftM Model
"The PFIRES life cycle consists of four major phases: Assess, Plan, Deliver, and
Operate. Each is sharply defined with specific exit criteria that should be met before
transitioning to the next phase. Each phase is further broken down into steps detailing
the activities that occur within each phase. These steps are explored with particular
attention paid to people, processes and technology issues. It is important to remember
that policy development is an iterative process. Therefore, the model includes feedback
loops at every step. Feedback is also necessary to ensure that the requirements of the
previous step, no matter where you are in the cycle, are being
satisfied." 1
The PFIRES life cycle introduces a meticulous framework for discovering,
managing, and mitigating risk within eCommerce environments. The framework is
1
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comprised of several phases when used in conjunction with one another supply
organizations with a complete, totally functional life cycle for addressing security
concerns. PFIRES like many other security concepts contends that the underlying
tasks involved in securing systems and infrastructures for eBusiness activities are
assessing and mitigating risks within those environments. However, the discussion of
risk usually spawns enormous debate as different opinions and thoughts on the subject
exist. Therefore, before this paper probes the different phases of the PFIRES
framework the next section will address risk and provide definitions and different views
on the topic.
Risk
"Infosecurity is about mitigating risk. Of course, there are many ways to define




The previous comments are from an article, which introduces the
reader to a formula for calculating risk within an enterprise. As stated the definition of
risk and how to mitigate it comes in many different flavors, however for the purposes of
this document risk pertaining to the securing of eBusiness architectures will be
examined. Several thought and concepts will be presented, but are in no way all
encompassing of potential risks within a corporation.
Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Cost.
8
"Threat
Threat is the frequency of potentially adverse events. Since threat (by this
definition) is always a frequency, it's always potentially measurable. And since the
events are only potentially adverse, threat per se is not necessarily dangerous or
detrimental.
Here are some examples. The threat rate of southern California
earthquakes greater than 4 on the Richter Scale is 21 per year. The threat rate of
hurricanes hitting Florida is 1 .4 per year. The threat rate of insiders who use somebody
else's logged-in PC to inappropriately access restricted information is approximately
four per 1 ,000 users per day. The threat rate of virus encounters by a 1 ,000-PC
organization is 88 per day. The threat rate of "attack-related
scans"
against a single IP
address is seven per day. And so on.




A local organization's geography, status, political stance or any other factor may
expose it to more or less threat than that of the global rate. The key to thinking about
this is to determine~or at least estimate-the rate of whatever threats face your







Though threat rates within a traditional organization can sometimes be
overwhelming when examining the actual numbers, those rates and hazardous
numbers grow astronomically when assessing the risk of on-line activities, particularly
eCommerce. The threats and potential threats grow as an organization opens it
perimeter to the world. The idea of classifying threats on regional or local basis is
eliminated because the Internet and business conducted via public networks makes all
threats and their potential global. The following thoughts provide additional insight into
identifying and assessing risks to information security.
'The process of identifying InfoSec risks, determining their magnitude, and
identifying areas needing safeguards is called risk assessment. In other words, you
assess the risk of a particular target, such as a new software application's impact on the
system's security processes, architecture, and the like.
The risk assessment process is subdivided into threats, vulnerability, and risks.
Threats are human-made or natural occurrences that could cause adverse
affects to systems and information when combined with specific vulnerabilities. For
example,
1. Natural threats include such things as fire, floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes;
2. Human-made threats or threat-related matters include such things as unauthorized
system access, hacker or cracker or phreaker programs, the perpetrators
themselves, theft of systems or services, denial of services, and destruction of
systems or
information." 9
The above comments raise an important issue which reflects back on an
organization knowing its assets and fully understanding what needs protecting. The
natural disasters mentioned above are certainly threats that must be addressed, but
are concerns that should be approached from a corporate perspective. Strategies for
business continuity, disaster recovery, automatic fail-over, etc should already be in
place before enterprises begin working on risk assessments and security policies for
eBusiness architectures. Additionally, corporations who have major investments in
eBusiness should not limit their concern for security to just those extremely
important digital assets, as physical properties require protection as well.
The comments following also reflect the importance of assessing risk, and how
damaging not protecting corporate assets can be. It also gives additional thought on
how to calculate risk as well as losses that may occur because of them.
"It's not enough to simply list a bunch of threats, you need to know how
much to worry about each of them. This is where risk assessment comes
in. The
basic idea is to take all the threats, estimate the expected loss per incident and the
'
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expected number of incidents per year, and then calculate the annual lose
expectancy
(ALE)." 10
Yes, indeed all threats should be evaluated, properly assessed and dealt
with in efforts to mitigate or manage risk. This is especially difficult to do within
eBusiness architectures as corporations actively invite legitimate customers and
adversaries to their infrastructures. Along with many foes and differing objectives
comes the uniqueness of many of the threats that exist, and new attacks against
eBusiness architectures and their assets are being generated and released more
frequently than ever before. These dangers are what make the process of
discovering risk and carefully evaluating each individually so critical to the success
of securing electronic domains, because you never know what a system will be up
against day by day.
"Of course there's going to be a lot of guesswork in any of these; the particular
risks we're talking about are just too new and too poorly understood to be better
quantized. For one thing, it might take a really sharp eye to spot the potential for
cascade failure; a small error that could eventually result in the loss of millions of
dollars." 10
A more generalized approach to evaluating risk follows. The strategy provides a
means of assessing risk and determining the level of risk a corporation must accept
to conduct business in the midst of these dangers. It is important to remember that
once individual risks have been identified the work has really not even begun as
efforts to eliminate possible complications can be and often are exhausting to
organizations and extremely costly.
"Risk is a Function of the Probability of an Event Occurring Coupled with the
Impact (Significance or Consequence) of the Occurrence. Risk
= Probability x Impact,
where Probability and Impact Are Defined In Terms of High, Medium, or Low. Risk Is
Defined Over a Range From Very High to Very
Low." 11
The chart that follows provides a high level approach to determining the priority
level that should be assigned to discovered risks. Assigning priority levels to risks is a
strategy utilized for both electronic and
traditional businesses that many vendors of
security based products have capitalized on, especially
in assessing vulnerabilities.
Vulnerabilities are precisely what allow adversaries to
capitalize on the risks that they
present to a corporation. Understanding and prioritizing these issues can
further assist
organizations in proactively eliminating or handling incidents
that are certain to rise.
The operative concept here is proactive. In order to truly gain and maintain a handle on
the risk factors that abound corporations must diligently pursue these matters and work
extensively on ensuring that they are not damaging
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The comments that follow represent some of the in-depth thoughts on threats
both in digital and physical worlds by Bruce Schneier. Mr. Schneier provides
excellent observations into the likeness and probability of physical and digital
threats, as well as why and how the things corporations fear in the physical are also
being exploited in the digital realm. Therefore, even companies who do not currently
participate in eBusiness activities and still consider their organizations traditional
brick-n-mortar establishments are still vulnerable to the risks that constantly plaque
eBusinesses.
"And the threats in the digital world mirror the threats in the physical world. If
embezzlement is a threat, then digital embezzlement is also a threat. If physical
banks are robbed, then digital banks will be robbed. Invasion of privacy is the same
problem whether the invasion takes the form of a photographer with a telephoto lens
or a hacker who can eavesdrop on private chat sessions.
Cyberspace crime
includes everything you'd expect from the
physical world: theft, racketeering,
vandalism, voyeurism, exploitation, extortion, con games,
fraud. There is even the
threat of physical harm: cyberstalking, attacks against the air traffic control system,
etc. To a first approximation, online society is the same as offline society. And to
the same first approximation, attacks share a lot of the same techniques
as attacks
in the physical world, they will be very different. They will be more
common. They
will be more widespread. It will be harder to track, capture, and convict the
perpetrators. And their effects will be more devastating. The Internet has three new
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characteristics that make this true. Any one of them is bad; the three together are
horrifying." 10
The previous comments also substantiate that the once clearly divided digital and
physical worlds are beginning to experience and are being forced to deal with similar
threats to corporate assets and business. Thus making it increasingly difficult to
accurately assess, manage, and if possible avoid or remove the danger of these
threats. Concerns of security in a digital world must no longer be associated with
the once high-flying Dot.Com revolution. The repercussions of inadequate security
strategies, mechanisms, and most importantly processes are a danger to all; this
includes both consumers and enterprises.
"Vulnerability
Vulnerability is the likelihood of success of a particular threat category against a
particular organization. Notice that if this were the likelihood of success of a
particular attack (e.g., the Ping of Death) against a particular machine, the likelihood
would be either 0 or 1 (0 percent or 100 percent). But since we are concerned about
vulnerability at an organizational level (with, say, 1 ,000 PCs and 50 servers
configured and architected in a particular way) to an entire class of threat, binary
terms don't work. Instead, vulnerability has to be quantified in terms of a probability
of success, expressed as a percent likelihood.
The likelihood of success is not easy to measure, but a related term,
"vulnerability
prevalence,"
is. Vulnerability prevalence is simply the number of machines
of a particular type (say, NT-based Web servers running IIS that are exposed to the
Internet) that exhibit a particular vulnerability.
Many factors work together to make some, but not all, machines vulnerable in their
current environment-even if the software, hardware and data is identical across
machines. Router rules, firewall configuration, proxy settings, NAT, location on a
subnet, OS type, co-existence of other running processes, existence of data of certain
types, existence of sample code or files, secondary connections of certain types-these
factors and many others change the likelihood of success of a particular
threat." 8
Vulnerability to common threats such as natural disasters, disgruntled employees,
and the like are extremely difficult to deal with within enterprise environments where
numerous factors must be compensated for. However, this difficulty increases
exponentially when attempting to secure the inevitable vulnerabilities of eBusiness
domains as literally almost every component of the architecture is susceptible to the
vulnerabilities of the others. If all of these are not promptly identified and accounted for
the negligence can quickly adapt a snowball effect and continuing efforts to eliminate






endeavors will be solely dependant on exactly how efficient the vendors of ones security
mechanisms are in discovering and providing solutions for vulnerabilities. Companies
must also actively track these vulnerabilities and apply patches and fixes wherever
appropriate. Or introduce more risk into the daily operations of eBusiness and
enterprise infrastructures.
"I argue that security is a chain, and a system is only as secure as the weakest link.
Vulnerabilities are these weak links. Finding a security vulnerability is only one step
toward exploiting it, though. Getting in a position to exploit the vulnerability, actually
exploiting that vulnerability, and then making a getaway are also important-you can't
have a successful attack without
them." 10
The above comments are certainly viable and should be easy to comprehend, yet
most organizations do not search for and strengthen those weak links. Instead they are
usually just accepted or partially dealt with. Considering that the previous statement
identifies the complexity and often difficulty involved in adversaries realizing success
with an attack companies should not make it easier on them by being lax in securing
their domains. An attack is not considered successful unless the culprit achieves the
intended objective without getting caught. So, increased security measures definitely
increases the probability of catching wiley hackers and the like and can also serve as an
effective deterrent to individuals or organizations that feel there chance of eluding
authorities is slim.
"The vulnerability landscape can be categorized several ways. I break it down into
four broad categories; the physical world, the virtual world, the trust model, and the
system's life cycle. They're related. An adversary may choose to attack in the physical
world-breaking and entering, setting off bombs, taking human life, and so on. Using the
Internet, the same adversary could chose to attack virtually-shutting down computer and
phone systems, hacking the police computers and putting out fake arrest warrants
against the entire board of directors, and the like. Attacks against a physical
infrastructure from the virtual world can often be conducted instantaneously and
remotely, without warning. They are often much nastier than attacks in the physical
world." <0
The previous thoughts on the vulnerability landscape briefly illustrate the complexity
involved in assessing vulnerabilities, especially if it's
done right. Organizations can not
limit their assessment efforts to only digital concerns or simply physical ones either. For
as was stated clever adversaries definitely have a wide variety of choices when
choosing attack targets and methods, both in
physical and virtual domains and the
combination of the two. Adequately securing both of these landscapes requires the
expertise of skilled professionals that have vast experience in the associated domain.
For example, a security expert for digital issues may
not be qualified to effectively




specialists operating in physical security, they may not have the expertise required to
successfully secure digital goods and assets, not to mention the accessibility of data.
"Vulnerabilities refer to weaknesses that allow specific threats to cause adverse
affects to systems and
information" 9
These vulnerabilities and threats are factors that
can comprise an organizations risk associated with securing business activities and
protecting them from detriment.
"Cost
Cost is the total cost of the impact of a particular threat experienced by a
vulnerable target. Hard-dollar costs are measured in terms of
"real"
damages to
hardware or software, as well as quantifiable IT staff time and resources spent repairing
these damages. Semi-hard costs might include such things as lost business or
transaction time during a period of downtime. Soft costs include such things as lost end
user productivity, public relations damage control, a decrease in user or public
confidence or lost business
opportunities." 8
Ah, finally the ultimate driving force for conducting risk, threat and vulnerability
analysis of systems and infrastructures, for most is to eliminate or reduce the
tremendous costs associated with security incidents. These financial numbers can be
astounding when all are totaled, and organizations that are on track to securing bottom
lines will be forced to identify security related concerns as possible weights on spending
and corporate financial goals. The truly scary part is that these costs continue to
increase as the need for security grows at an astronomical rate, thus rendering these
concerns not only legitimate, but also critical!
"It's not threat, vulnerability or cost alone that really matters, but risk. As you can
see from the risk equation, for there to be any risk there must be at least some threat
and vulnerability and cost. The concept we all learned in sixth grade-that anything
multiplied by zero is zero-means that if any one of the three components of risk is zero,
then the risk is also zero.
In most instances, you won't be able to say for sure that any of the three risk
factors is zero. Instead, you'll need to measure each component of risk.
Vulnerability is often the first thing to address, since that's where you typically
have the most control. There are always many places where you can at least partially
reduce vulnerability, and do so easily and inexpensively. We call these partial solutions
"synergistic
controls."
They are overlooked by almost everyone, but are exceedingly








It's probably safe to assume that not all will agree on the thoughts above relating
to the equation and factors of zero. This is why it is extremely important to evaluate
risks individually and on a continual basis, because if this is not adapted a company
may never really know what risks, threats, vulnerabilities, or potential costs exist. Often
times an organization may apply a value of zero to one of the factors simply because
they have not recognized an instance yet. This can lead to adverse effects, and if not
thoroughly reevaluated can be a constant problem within a particular system or domain.
The extreme importance of assessing and mitigating or managing risks within an
eBusiness environment or any infrastructure can never be overly expressed, because it
is actually these risks that the security arm of any organization is attempting to protect
against. Therefore, the initial work associated with risk assessment should be taken
seriously and receive full support from management and the entire organization if it is to
be successful. The brief introduction to risk that preceded is simply a primer and
assessments and mitigation activities will differ for every organization, but the point
intended to be expressed was the importance and sheer magnitude of conducting these
somewhat tiresome tasks. However, it is assured that if properly initiated and controlled
risk management will serve as a benefit to corporations.
Now that risk has been introduced and defined the text will again focus on
security frameworks and life cycle approaches. The next section will cover the initial
phase of the PFIRES framework and provide insight and further knowledge into how to
assign and associate risks and assessments.
"Assess Phase
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The Assess phase can be initiated by two distinct events: either a decision to
execute the model from scratch or a response to a proposed change output from the
Review Trends and Manage Events step. In either case, the goal is to assess the
proposed change against the existing policy and organizational environment.
The outputs of the Assess Phase are:




A completed Risk Assessment
A decision on whether to implement the proposed change
A communications strategy and
plan" 1
As the above remarks imply conducting an assessment of an organizations
security strategy or already existing security policy for whatever reason are actions that
can initiate the usage of the PFIRES model. Thorough, in-depth assessments of
existing security efforts or needed security functions are the genesis of any sound
defensive strategy for eBusiness architectures. Efficient assessments can identify
possible vulnerabilities and associated risks within an existing policy or an infrastructure
lacking a functional policy, as well as provide additional insight into actions to be taken
in securing eBusiness environments and reducing vulnerabilities and mitigating risk.
'The Assess phase has three possible results:
The proposed change is accepted. The Plan phase is initiated with the




The proposed change is not accepted but the Policy Assessment
determines that policy should be updated. The Plan phase is initiated
with the Policy Assessment as input.
If the proposed change is not accepted and the Policy Assessment
determines that policy does not need
updating. The model resumes in
the Operate
phase."
The illustration below further demonstrates the possible results from
conducting and completing the
assessment phase of the PFIRES framework. As
stated a policy assessment is not the only
alternative within the assess phase, a
risk assessment may be a viable option
for an organization as well.
1
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For an organization actively employing the PFIRES strategy it is absolutely
imperative that either a thorough policy or risk assessment be conducted, or in most
cases both are probably needed. These assessments must be initiated and completed
before any changes to policy or procedure should be considered. The results of both of
the assessments will serve as some of the key requirements in developing or updating
an effective policy and security program. The security requirements gathering effort is
instrumental in the development of a security policy. It is intended to take into
consideration not only technical aspects of an organizations security needs, but
business requirements will be of an extreme importance as well.
Failure to adequately conduct requirements gathering and apply the resulting
requirements to the development of security policies puts the policy itself, as well as the
individual company at risk of introducing numerous gaps and vulnerabilities into security
architectures. Often times because of diverse business needs enterprises are forced to
sacrifice or tradeoff some of the resulting requirements from the gathering activities.
This is perfectly acceptable, but it is extremely important that the company make the
distinction between requirements of necessity and those of luxury or desirable feature
sets. Being willing to forgo the latest biometrics technology in order to implement a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is certainly a valid trade. However, to neglect firewall
requirements or perimeter defenses to employ cool Java smart card technology is
certainly not acceptable, as the repercussions will definitely be
felt in the long run.
Conducting trade studies against requirements is a very sensitive issue and should be
handled as such in order to avoid the havoc that can be caused if it is taken lightly.
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"Policy Assessment Step
Whether PFIRES is initiated due to initial policy creation or a change to
existing policy, Policy Assessment is conducted to review existing policies,
standards, guidelines and procedures. Outputs of this step include:
A determination of whether the proposed change is strategic or
tactical in nature (i.e., the scope of the proposed change)




A communications strategy and plan
The determination of whether the proposed change is strategic or tactical
will affect how steps later in the life cycle will be explored; however, if this is the
organization's first time executing the model, the effort is by definition strategic in
nature.
Policy Assessment Scope
On a continuum of change, we define the two end points as tactical and
strategic. Tactical changes are those which involve short-term goal achievement
and how to control and evaluate the process of achieving goals, whereas
strategic changes are long-term, broad-based initiatives that involve positioning
within the marketplace and typically involve members of senior management.






Once the policy assessment is complete, a decision needs to be made on where
within the change continuum the proposed change falls. The position on the change
continuum that the proposed change falls will help determine the scope of the Risk
Assessment step, therefore influencing the execution of the subsequent steps of the life
cycle. Note that if this is the organization's first time through the model, the effort is
always strategic in
nature." 1
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The paragraphs above make an interesting observation in stating the need for
defining whether organization's security efforts are strategic or tactical. The actual
approach taken for security endeavors can often make or break a corporation's chances
of success. For example many organizations will take a gun ho attitude towards
securing their assets and rush to implement technologies, products, and proprietary
solutions. These efforts are tactical in nature and can also be very destructive to the
security of the same organization. It is extremely difficult to successfully be tactical if
there are no strategic plans and efforts already in place. The two simply will offset and
possibly negate each other, because short term, tactical plans are not in-line with long
term, strategic goals. Lack of proper consideration for both, but especially strategic
initiatives could prove to be disastrous, because they will eventually fail or be
abandoned for need of compliance with future outlooks.
Security initiatives should never be a fly by night event. This is especially true of
policy creation and deployment, which can often be a strenuous process. Organizations
should never expect to construct an adequate policy overnight, nor expect to employ the
finished product in a day or two. Additionally, effective security programs within
eBusiness environments definitely require strategic planning and initiative if expected to
be successful and experience continued success throughout the life cycle of a system
or architecture. Without proper strategizing security efforts will definitely be lacking of
the direction and insight needed to be aligned with the forward plans of the corporate
business model. Security architectures will also be unable to facilitate business needs
and appropriately adjust configurations to meet customer requirements if the strategic
goal is not addressed or at least introduced early on. In an eBusiness environment
being able to look ahead is key, and even more critical when dealing with security for
those environments.
"Policy Assessment Methodology
Four sub-steps are contained within the Policy Assessment step: Analyze
Policy Environment, Identify Policy Gaps and Contradictions, Summarize Policy
Assessment Results, and Develop Policy Recommendations. Executed in
sequence, these sub-steps result in a decision on whether to accept the
proposed changes and an assessment of how the proposed change affects
existing
policy." 1
The diagram that follows further illustrates the Policy Assessment Methodology
and the subtasks that exist within this portion of the PFIRES model. It also
demonstrates the continual emphasis on process and efficient procedural actions for
embracing the framework and being successful in securing the
infrastructures it is
deployed to protect.
The overall Policy Assessment Methodology provides eBusinesses
with a
meticulous approach to thoroughly investigating the environment being secured. It also





assists in identifying any areas that were overlooked or not given enough consideration,
which in turn can be instrumental in negating possible vulnerabilities that could
eventually be exploited. Policy assessments and resulting changes can often have
serious rippling effects within an on-line environment and both negative
and positive
implications if not handled delicately. The following observations will explore these
implications particularly concerning eCommerce and related business
endeavors.
"eCommerce Implications
The rapid rate of change in eCommerce ~ even for those companies
already involved in eBusiness has far-reaching implications for security
policy.
These changes, particularly the sharing of organizational
information sources
with customers and other participants in the supply chain, can have an
enormous
impact. Each proposed change must be reviewed carefully and expeditiously
against existing security strategy and policy to
ensure that existing policies are
not contradicted and gaps in existing security policy are
identified." 1
"Risk Assessment Step
Risk Assessment identifies the business assets an organization
wants to
protect, and identifies potential threats
to those assets by asking these questions:
What am I trying to protect?
What do I need to protect against?
How much am I willing to spend to
have adequate protection?
What is the cost versus the benefit for the
business?
Risk Assessment Methodology
Risk Assessment consists of four
sub-steps: Conduct Security
Assessment Assess Business Risk, Develop Security
Recommendations, and
Summarize Risk Assessment Results.
Executed in sequence, these sub-steps
result in a decision of whether to
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Once again this discussion of security has found its way back to risk assessment,
and rightfully so as the topic is so very important. The Risk Assessment Step of the
PFIRES model zeros in on the critical objectives of a risk assessment exercise. It
expresses the importance of knowing what needs to be protected, what are assets
being protected from, and of course the financial implications involved in either
protecting or not protecting these assets. The methodology of the Risk Assessment
Step also factors in the extremely important mission of assessing and protecting
business models from risks associated with eBusiness security. Organizations can
sometimes place too much weight on either technical or business concerns and this
makes the enterprise even more vulnerable than before. It is important for companies
to realize the importance and necessity of addressing both technical and business
related risks of security, and then compensate accordingly for both.
For any risk assessment activities it is necessary to thoroughly document assets,
potential risks, history of risks and vulnerabilities, and the entire assessment activities.
Documenting these efforts can serve catalysts for continued risk mitigation for years to
come if properly conducted. Additionally, documenting all of this information will assist
in mitigating discovered or reoccurring risk, as well as eliminating vulnerabilities within
the corporate eBusiness infrastructure.
On the other hand a failure to adequately document these procedures can and
will lead to gaps and islands of knowledge on the subject, which will probably be
contained in the minds of individuals who participated in the risk analysis. This itself
creates an additional risk as a company becomes reliant on an employee who
possesses critical corporate knowledge and in today's high pace market no one can
guarantee the loyalty and commitment of employees to one particular company.
Therefore, these situations must be avoided in order to have even a remote chance of
successfully securing not only eBusiness architectures,
but also enterprises in general.
The PFIRES model provides a basic means of documenting these activities with a risk
assessment matrix. The matrix supplies organizations utilizing the PFIRES framework
with an example of how to efficiently record the necessary
data. Of course this matrix
can be modified to meet the specific needs of a corporation, and probably should be in
order to effectively address the specific
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The PFIRES framework is definitely a viable solution for an organization planning
on implementing a life cycle approach to managing security for its eBusiness initiatives.
However, considering that every organization is somewhat unique and business and
security needs will differ for each individual
corporation it is safe to assume that many
companies will not see the PFIRES model as the most appropriate solution for them.
As was stated earlier there are many frameworks and life cycles that already
exist to
meet the security needs of eBusinesses the
important thing is to either select an
existing model or tailor one to meet the
specific needs of ones business. Therefore,
before this paper continues with the PFIRES framework it will introduce other models as
well. This section will continue to cover the initial phase of all the models examined and
will progress from there in subsequent sections. Readers should begin to see the
underlying strategy within all of the
models. Regardless of the structure and
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implementation strategies the underlying process and foundations are extremely similar
and should reiterate the importance of following these methodologies whether to the tee
or in a modified format.
"Security is a business fundamental in the physical world. No organization would
even consider opening operations without securing all facilities against theft, fire and
vandalism. Nevertheless, companies engaging in E-commerce routinely shortchange
their protection of key online assets and systems. A single security breach in the online
world can be far more damaging than it would be in the physical world in terms of
strategic information lost, bad publicity, loss of customer and partner confidence, and
stakeholder liability. Once this realization hits home, information security quickly
becomes a key priority for e-business.
Complicating the issue is a general lack of security management awareness at
all levels of an organization. From senior management to customers and suppliers,
security is perceived at best as a necessary evil. At worst, it is an expensive and
unwanted intrusion into normal business operations. This inappropriate view must be
overcome in order to establish strong, consistent security practices. And yet, without a
clear demonstration that security management adds value through network
transparency, any security process will be actively subverted by its users. Both
individuals and operating units must understand and invest in a process that clearly
demonstrates security management as an enabler that accelerates achievement of
business goals.
A successful security management solution should begin as an integral part of an
organization'
s overall business strategy. Once security management is accepted as a
core business operation, it necessitates the development of guidelines that create the
security practices necessary to support the business strategy. These guidelines,
therefore, are what most organizations understand to be their security policy. The policy
in turn drives the development of an overall security management architecture. Finally,
this framework is monitored for vulnerability, attack and misuse. The end result is
improved information availability, integrity and confidentiality, from both inside and
outside the
organization." 12
The comments above provide wonderful insight into the security problems that
usually exist within eBusiness environments, as well as what has spawned them. It
introduces the difficult, but absolutely necessary issue of managing security for
eBusiness, which can often be the most difficult portion of a security solution. The
diagram below illustrates how availability, integrity, and confidentiality work together to
provide the security functionality both inside and outside of an enterprise.
12
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As the diagram illustrates enterprise security encompasses many different
aspects and covers a wide variety of areas, or at least it should. The pyramid above
outlines some of the key areas that must be addressed and that availability,
confidentiality, and integrity must be injected into. The failure of organizations to
adequately deal with all of these aspects opens them up to new and already existing
risks, as well as vulnerabilities and threats. The following section will introduce and
examine a life cycle approach to properly securing and providing the needed
functionality for all of the areas in the diagram above. Initially, the first phase of the life
cycle will be addressed and will continue to be examined in later sections.
The next life cycle covered further substantiates that in order to effectively apply
security within an eBusiness environment it is dependant on more than simply installing
firewalls or PKIs. The necessary attention must be continual, and aggression should
increase as new threats are surfacing daily. Without this focused attention and
continual process of eliminating security risks companies are not truly addressing
security issues, but rather providing patches for threats as they appear, which is a
dangerous ideology in itself.
"This fundamental security management life cycle contains five interrelated
processes -assess, design, deploy, manage/support and educate. These five elements
work as a closed-loop system, allowing the security cycle to
grow and respond to
changing network needs and conditions. Each element is
defined below, with detailed
descriptions of the four sequential steps in the following sections.
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Assess- A BS7799-based, systematic baseline identification of all network devices and
resources, and the establishment of valuations for all groups of data residing on the
network. Assessment converts general descriptions of the network into measurable data
sets that can then be used to design an effective security management policy and
infrastructure.
Design - Conversion of assessment data into lists of network security applications,
deployment locations, implementation strategies and specific configuration guidelines
for each network device or security application. At the completion of this stage, the
security policy exists as a completed document, accompanied by a deployment plan for
all necessary technologies.
Deploy- The physical process of implementing the plans created in the design phase.
Includes installation, testing, training and conversion to a production environment.
Manage andSupport- Measuring performance data from the network security
infrastructure against the goals stated in the security policy. Non-compliant systems and
events trigger specific actions, as stated in the policy, including a re-evaluation of the
policy and restart of the policy generation process. This stage can manifest itself as
either in-house operation or, more commonly, as outsourced managed security
services, and should include a detailed incident response plan.
Education - An ongoing effort to raise awareness of the need for network security at
the executive, management, administrator and end user levels. This process cuts
across all other steps, and includes both administrator training for emerging threats to
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systems and awareness among end users of the benefits of working within the security
architecture."12
The fundamental security management life cycle is another excellent example of
a detailed, procedure intensive approach to managing information based security. The
five individual steps that make up the life cycle are all in-depth and cover their
respective areas accordingly. When used in conjunction with one another these five
steps introduce an adequate security framework for eBusiness environments. However,
as with any life cycle simply providing an organization with an introduction to a well-
defined process certainly does not guarantee the success of a particular concept. In
order to realize the success of a secure architecture for eBusiness the fundamental
security management life cycle must be aggressively pursued and continually revisited
and examined to ensure the necessary protection is being provided under not only this
life cycle but any framework for security.
As was mentioned earlier the initial phase or step of a security life cycle is
absolutely critical for success. Like the PFIRES model the subject framework begins its
operation within a phase of assessment, which also provides organizations with key
information about their infrastructure that is much needed to secure these
environments. Just as in the PFIRES model the fundamental security management life
cycle places a huge emphasis on assessments and realizes the importance of adequate
evaluations. The following section will examine in greater detail the assess step of the
fundamental security management life cycle and provide further thought and insight into
addressing the tasks involved in this activity.
"Assess
Assessment turns general statements of intent into quantified, regulated sets of data
that can be converted into an automated and measurable information security system.
Information gathered in the assess process includes:
What is on the network?
- Identification of all network devices, applications and services
- Identification of who has access
- Identification of value
- Identification of risk of compromise from inside workgroups, networks or the enterprise
- Identification of risk of compromise from Internet Service Providers (ISPs) partners,
vendors, customers and anyone else with external access
- Valuation of damage from compromise from the inside
Valuation of damage from compromise from the outside
- Identification of all data stored on the network
- Identification of who has access
- Identification of value
-Identification of hosts, network devices and databases already susceptible to attack
- Attacks from inside the network
- Attacks from outside the network
12
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- Attacks against affiliated partner/vendor/supplier networks from inside the network
- Attacks against affiliated partner/vendor/supplier networks from outside the network
Who needs to be involved in the security policy decision-making process?
- Executive level
- Which staff?
- What are the business goals that improved security management supports?
Education helps support this part of the process.
- What is necessary to co-opt support, reach consensus and obtain signed approval?
- IT level
- Which staff?
- Will they be threatened by new processes and procedures? Education helps support
this part of the process.
- What is necessary to co-opt support, reach consensus and obtain signed approval?
- Security management level
- Which staff?
- Will they be threatened by new processes & procedures? Education helps support
this part of the process.
- What is necessary to co-opt support, reach consensus and get signed approval?
-Human Resources and Legal staff
- Do current and proposed security measures meet corporate employment policy
standards?
- Do current and proposed security measures meet the
organization'
s legal
requirements? Is legal liability sufficiently controlled?
- End users, vendors, partners, customers, etc.
- What are the advantages to them for adopting a more secure corporate posture?
Education helps support this part of the process.
- What are the business goals of these outside entities that an enhanced security
posture supports?
- What is necessary to co-opt support, reach consensus and get signed approval?
Asking the correct questions is a surprisingly simple process, but the amount of data
that is generated in even a small organization can be intimidating. As a result, many
organizations use outside specialists to provide assessment services. This sizeable
collection of data, once collated and organized, represents a data web illustrating the
breadth of the entire security management environment. Its comprehensive
reach
becomes the foundation for designing an effective security management architecture.
Once published, this document is the enterprise security
policy." 2
As the paragraph above explains data generated during a survey or assessment
can be extremely overwhelming. This is especially true
for risk, vulnerability, and
security assessments conducted within dynamic eBusiness
environments. However,
this data is very important and vital to an
organization's security and must be
approached as if a company's livelihood depends upon it.
12
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The comments above also describe the process of asking the right questions
during an assessment as a simple task, but this can easily become quite the contrary if
the proper professionals are not leading and involved in the assessment efforts. Not
asking all the appropriate questions leads to a lapse or absence of necessary
requirements and eventually to vulnerabilities and risks being created. As the previous
comments imply the correct person for the job often does not exist within an
organization and outside entities must be hired. Outsourcing assessment practices is
certainly a viable option and can sometimes be the most appropriate one as well, but
dangers also exist within this alternative.
Outsourcing in general usually introduces additional risk to initiatives, as certain
uncontrollable factors are inserted into the program. Primarily the fact that an outside
agency often has to be given access to a corporations vital business assets in order to
thoroughly conduct assessments. Additionally, risks exist after the evaluations are
concluded, because whether or not an organization accepts the assessors
recommendations the corporate jewels have been exposed. The company is also at
risk of deciding to ignore legitimate concerns and being faced to reap dire repercussions
later on. Outsourcing is definitely a sensitive issue within security domains. It can be
an excellent resource, as well as a huge detriment if not approached and managed
correctly. As more and more organizations continue to consider outsourced solutions it
is absolutely crucial that they proceed with care.
The proposed questions in the above section provide an excellent start to an
assessment, but frankly depending on the organization these can be just the tip of the
iceberg. All of the areas outlined above must absolutely be covered in great detail, and
exhaustive efforts must continue until the assessment activities are concluded.
Considering the uniqueness of any organization more emphasis may be placed on one
area than another in order to meet the individual business needs of that organization,
but by no means should any areas be completely ignored.
Once the data from an assessment has been gathered and properly reviewed
and stored, enterprises must remember that this information must now be considered a
corporate asset and protected accordingly. These documents will contain extremely
important information and can and will be used against an organization if not properly
handled with care. Additionally, all subsequent assessments should be treated in the
same fashion. This is true for enterprise level assessments, as well as those conducted
within divisions and departments. This data must never be exposed, for the
consequences are deadly!
Continuing the examination of the initial phase of
several life cycle approaches to
securing enterprises the next example is somewhat
different that the previous models.
The following section will describe the initial step in the
Systems Security Engineering
Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) 2.0. The SSE-CMM is a
life cycle technique that
can be used within several different areas including engineering environments, security
product evaluations, security practitioners, integrators,
etc. The subject life cycle
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though extremely efficient in addressing the critical factors involved in creating,
implementing, and managing security frameworks addresses it from a different angle.
The SSE-CMM is a more engineering focused framework, which is very detailed and
process intensive, it also is structured to work closely with engineering departments and
other areas of an organization.
The next section will introduce the reader to the concepts and techniques
involved in the SSE-CMM. Additionally, it will provide insight into how to employ this life
cycle into various environments and business areas. The following quotes will primarily
address the overall structure and the initial step in the SSE-CMM processes, but the
remaining steps will be covered in later sections of the thesis.
'The SSE-CMM divides security engineering into three basic areas: risk,
engineering, and assurance. While these areas are by no means independent from one
another, it is possible to consider them separately. At the simplest level, the risk process
identifies and prioritizes dangers inherent to the developed product or system. The
security engineering process works with the other engineering disciplines to determine
and implement solutions to the problems presented by the dangers. Finally, the







The comments and diagram above provide a brief description of the functionality
and areas covered by the SSE-CMM model. As was stated
earlier it differs from
previous life cycles that have been examined in that it does not only focus on eBusiness
environments or security policy development.
Instead the subject model addresses
security from an engineering perspective which
deals with the development and
assurance of secure engineering practices for an
enterprise. Additionally, it does not
posses as many phases as other life cycles,
but it definitely is as intense and detailed
as the others. Though, the SSE-CMM takes a differing
approach to securing systems
the life cycle still realizes the extreme importance of assessing the
targeted environment
13
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and becoming knowledgeable of risks and associated effects. This is demonstrated
below in the description of the risk phase of the model, which should be the initial
activity of any company employing the framework. The risk process described further
substantiates the extreme need of conducting these types of assessments, as they can
often determine if an organization will be successful or fail in their security endeavors.
Although, only the risk process of the SSE-CMM will be covered in this section
readers will realize its importance and how it ties into the overall framework later on.
The SSE-CMM bridges all three of its components quite well in establishing a well
defined, meticulous process for security engineering. The risk process below will
provide an introduction and starting point for approaching security engineering and
effectively implementing the framework into any organization.
"Risk
A major goal of security engineering is the reduction of risk. Risk
assessment is the process of identifying problems that have not yet occurred.
Risks are assessed by examining the likelihood of the threat and vulnerability
and by considering the potential impact of an unwanted incident. Associated with
that likelihood is a factor of uncertainty, which will vary dependent upon a
particular situation. This means that the likelihood can only be predicted within
certain limits. In addition, impact assessed for a particular risk also has
associated uncertainty, as the unwanted incident may not turn out as expected.
Because the factors may have a large amount uncertainty as to the accuracy of
the predictions associated with them, planning and the justification of security
can be very difficult.
An unwanted incident is made up of three components: threat,
vulnerability, and impact. Vulnerabilities are properties of the asset that may be
exploited by a threat and include weaknesses. If neither is present there can be
no unwanted incident and thus no risk. Risk management is the process of
accessing and quantifying risk, and establishing an acceptable level
of risk for
the organization. Managing risk is an important part of the management of
security.
Risks are mitigated by the implementation of safeguards, which may
address the threat, the vulnerability, the impact, or the risk itself. However, it is













This is in large part due to the cost of risk mitigation, and to the associated
uncertainties. Thus, some residual risk must always be accepted. In the
presence of high uncertainty, risk acceptance becomes very problematical due to
its inexact nature. One of the few areas under the risk taker's control is the
uncertainty associated with the system. The SSE-CMM process areas include
activities that ensure that the provider organization is analyzing threats,
vulnerabilities, impacts, and associated
risk." 13
The risk process of the SSE-CMM covers not only risk but also the assessment
of threat, vulnerability, and the possible impacts of all of these. All of this information is
gathered for each component of risk factors to an organization and utilized in
subsequent sections to engineer and manage security solutions and establish
assurance programs. Since each component of risk is thoroughly evaluated and
documented the risk process for the SSE-CMM can be considered a long, drown out
effort. However, it is important to remember that the more time spent on these activities
means the more knowledgeable security professionals within an organization are about
the existing and possible risks to their eBusiness efforts, as well as the enterprise in
general. Choosing to take short cuts may save time and energy and possibly money in
the short term, but further down the road when new vulnerabilities and threats begin to
appear those who took the shortcut will wish they had not. This can be especially
frustrating when an organization discovers that they are not faced with new threats, but
old, existing vulnerabilities have simply begun to be exploited and the entire ordeal
13
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could have been avoided if the seemingly unnecessary extra time had been spent in the
beginning.
Now that assessment has been touched upon it is clear exactly how important
this step is in any life cycle or framework for security. To field adequate solutions that
can be effectively managed the environment, assets needing protection, risk, and so on
must be thoroughly and exhaustively examined. Furthermore, this is not a one-time
exercise. Assessments should be conducted periodically in order to obtain the most up
to date information about security initiatives. Whether these assessments are
conducted internally or outsourced they must be implemented and considered an
integral part of en enterprises defenses. The truth be told organizations should employ
both internal and external assessment vehicles as it is almost guaranteed that both will
overlook or take something lightly. Incorporating a revolving schedule of both internal
and outsourced audits and assessments creates a system of checks and balances for
security managers of eBusiness domains. This is extremely important as no security
tool or process is totally guaranteed or impenetrable.
As this thesis continues the reader will be presented with strategies for
combating inherent risks and vulnerabilities, as well as those discovered during or after
an assessment. The importance of a life cycle approach will continually be
reverberated throughout the document and the importance of mitigating risk will be a
central theme. Subsequent sections will demonstrate the continuance of a security life
cycle in addressing vulnerabilities and threats discovered during an assessment phase.
It is absolutely crucial for companies to be aggressive in dealing with risks after they
have been discovered. Not acting quickly could prove to be the downfall of a corporate
eBusiness, as well as vital corporate resources within these environments.
Risks, threats, vulnerabilities, adversaries, etc. none of these should taken for
granted nor neglected. These among others are what your security strategy should be
protecting against, whether it is tactical or strategic in nature. These dangers are
present everywhere and are beginning to become more sophisticated and difficult to
detect, eliminate, or manage. Organizations should utilize available resources to
combat these enemies in order to sustain positive business operations. Those
eBusinesses that have not taken an aggressive approach to securing not only their
networks, but ensuring that suppliers, partners, and customers are abiding by the
security policies and standards put in place are quite frankly a powder keg waiting to
explode or implode depending on the situation.
Those companies that feel as if they have not been exploited so far and therefore
have nothing to fear are only fooling themselves. As was stated earlier those
companies who say they have not been infiltrated say so because they do not realize it
yet. These same systems could possibly be staging grounds for the next devastating
Distributed Denial of Service attack on unsuspecting eBusinesses, simply because
vulnerabilities have not been discovered or fixed. This will also become a risk for
enterprises as security negligence is rapidly becoming enforceable by law and
organizations will be made to compensate for this negligence. Yes, it is getting
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interesting, but also very serious. As technology continues to advanced individuals and
organizations that utilize it must act responsibly and consider all whom they interact with
both physically and virtually or suffer the destined consequences.
A Quest for Cornerstones
All strong and stable architectures are built upon solid foundations. The need for
a sturdy foundation is an existing requirement for building, system, social, and all other
infrastructures that simply can not be overlooked. This same requirement is present for
designing security architectures for eBusiness and could possibly be considered even
more important within these domains. Establishing an adequate foundation for security
architectures in general involves addressing and implementing several security
concepts and for eBusiness these concepts remain the same but must often be
approached from a different aspect due to the unique nature of the environment. These
concepts are the cornerstones of security and in order to ensure the protection of
information systems these vital seeds must be planted and nurtured to generate the
needed roots of effective security.
The tried and true cornerstones of traditional security are Availability,
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Non-Repudiation. These four concepts and all their
associated processes, technologies, and measures must be placed at the corners of
any sound security architecture, as they provide the basis for secure operations.
However, within eBusiness environments a fifth consideration must be included, that
fifth cornerstone is access control or identification and authentication (l&A). Below is a
brief description of each concept.
Availability
- addresses the continuity and assurance of business systems
being available, accessible, and operational for employees, customers,
suppliers, partners, etc. This availability includes the capability of
continuing operations in the event of an attack and should possess the
ability to fail-over to backup systems and quickly recover from unavoidable
down times.
"Availability refers to the continuity of IT processing and the
availability of information. Availability breaches affect an enterprise's
business operations and may cause and enterprise to experience financial
or customer service impact. Adequate configuration of the systems and
controlled processes and procedures guard against denial of service
attacks, thus preserving system
availability." 14
The importance of availability should be obvious, for if systems and architectures
are not operational or functioning properly they can not serve their purpose. This is
especially true of systems for eBusiness, as their
sole purpose is to interact with
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consumers and other entities involved in daily business activities. Being unavailable is
simply not an option!
Confidentiality - addresses the need for discretion and privacy when
individuals, organizations, and systems alike are interacting and
transacting with each other. This component is necessary in protecting
information or corporate assets from unauthorized adversaries and
potential threats. The common approach to providing a solution to this
issue is to employ encryption technologies, so if the asset is compromised
it will not be usable by unauthorized parties.
"Confidentiality refers to the protection of information from
unauthorized disclosure to a person or computing entity. Enforcing
security controls to ensure confidentiality protects data residing on shared
media and/or in transit from eavesdropping. Cryptography enables
confidentiality and protects data from prying
eyes." 14
Again, this security component is also extremely vital to the success of
eBusinesses, as there exists and absolute requirement to protect customer data such
as personal information, credit card data, business information, etc. If this assurance is
not guaranteed to consumers they will not be likely to interact with an organizations
eBusiness systems, and should not be expected to. Confidentiality is an absolute
requirement of eBusiness and simply can not be ignored or inadequately implemented.
Integrity
- addresses the need of ensuring that data accessed by or from a
system is accurate and has not been altered or manipulated in anyway.
The integrity of data and associated assets must be thoroughly examined
and maintained before accepted or utilized within organizations, and more
importantly before it is disseminated to customers. This problem is usually
addressed by associating some sort of check sum with data to enforce
integrity. If the data has been tampered with the check sum will signal
authorized users of foul play.
"Integrity controls protect the data and/or computing resources from
any intentional or unintentional
tampering. Integrity ensures the accuracy
and completeness of information. Integrity violations include the
tampering of information before it reaches its intended recipient,
destroying information and software, making uncontrolled changes to
IT
systems in an operations environment, and so on. Security controls such
as malicious software control (e.g., antivirus software, mobile software
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Ensuring the integrity of data, as well as the processing of the same data is yet
another extreme requirement for secure eBusiness. Companies must assure that data
being utilized internally, by suppliers, customers, partners, etc. is legitimate and
accurate and has not been modified inappropriately by any unauthorized entities.
Non-Repudiation - addresses the ability to guarantee that users of
systems can not deny actions they undertook or initiated. Considering
that the majority of eBusiness activities are conducted via digital means
providing this capability is very important in providing organizations a way
of proving disputed actions by system users.
"Nonrepudiation controls ensure that users cannot deny actions
they undertook. For example, a user may enter a financial transaction
(e.g., a stock order) and later deny entering the transaction.
Nonrepudiation controls (e.g., digital signatures), especially those
enforced through public-key encryption, prevent such
incidents." 14
Non-Repudiation controls are becoming more and more of a necessity as
transactions and interactions continuously migrate to digital plains. Within eBusiness
these controls are vital as virtually all business is conducted electronically and no paper
trails exist. These controls are also gaining increased support and popularity as digital
signatures are being used more frequently.
Access Controls - addresses the requirement of allowing access to
enterprise data and assets to authorized individuals, organizations, and
external systems and only authorized entities. These controls provide
security architectures the functionality to determine if entities are allowed
access or not, as well as what they are allowed to access once initial
access has been granted.
"Access control authenticates the identity of the entity (human or
computer) trying to access a computing resource, and controls the use of
the computing resource per predetermined levels
of entitlement. The topic
of access control thus includes related issues of authentication and
authorization."14
Being able to control access to architectures and systems
whether they are
utilized for eBusiness or traditional enterprise functions has proven to be one of the
most important aspects and concepts of systems security. Without access controls
distributed systems would be time bombs that would certainly detonate daily, for anyone
could access these systems and the data that they stored, as well as the processing
power that exists within them. Access control technologies is a lucrative field of security
that has and continues to grow and expand as eBusinesses introduce new
requirements and place demands on vendors that did not exist before. This is actually a
14
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good thing, because it forces the technology to continue to evolve and examine all
possibilities and exceptions. However, the most important thing to remember is that the
advanced technologies in access controls are totally useless if not employed and
employed correctly. Additionally, these functions must be properly administered and
closely watched and not installed and left to manage themselves.
All of the above components are extremely vital to the foundation of security
architectures and must be implemented and continually nurtured to protect systems and
domains during their daily operations regardless of the environment. Although all the
aforementioned concepts and mechanisms are the cornerstones of effective security
there is another that serves as the foundation for even these cornerstones. This base
though mentioned after the others is probably more important than any of the rest, and
can determine if the four or five cornerstones will be effective and serve as a support
structure for their security architectures. The very important and often neglected
security policy must serve as the foundation and web that supports and joins availability,
confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and access control. Without an adequate
security policy all of the other components will function independently as islands of
security, thus leaving gaps and vulnerabilities between those islands. It is the security
policy that creates the bridges to connect all components of security architectures and
increases its functionality and effectiveness.
Although most enterprises have incorporated security policies for corporate
structures, networks, personal computers, and physical assets as well. The majority of
these policies were created decades ago and many have never been revisited or
revised. These policies which were once adequate for legacy and mainframe
environments have become absolete with increases in networking activities and
especially the expanded usage of the Internet and associated technologies. They do
not effectively address the new threats and vulnerabilities that are inherently present
when embracing these technologies. These thoughts are further justified by the
comments below.
"Security policies, procedures, and technologies are supposed to combine to
yield acceptable risk levels for enterprise systems. However, the nature of security
threats, and the probability that they can be successfully deployed against enterprise
systems, have changed. This is partly a result of the diffusion of computer technology
and computer networking into enterprises, and partly a result of the Internet.
For larger and older organizations, security policies were developed to address
security vulnerabilities and threats in legacy mainframe environments. Legacy policies
have been supplemented to address newer threats such as computer viruses, remote
access, and e-mail. In this author's experience, it is rare for current policy frameworks
to effectively address network-based threats. LANs and
PCs were the first steps in
what has become a marathon of increasing complexity and inter-relatedness; Intranet
(internal networks and applications based on IP), extranet, and Internet initiatives are
the most common examples of
this." 15
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As the above comments imply old outdated security policies are not addressing
the needs and requirements of current day infrastructures. This is especially true of
eBusiness architectures that are so dynamic in nature securing them is often more
difficult than securing an entire corporate network. These inadequate security policies
are the root of security problems within eBusiness architectures and often the direct
cause of many vulnerabilities that exist. The outdated policies do not address the
threats of the present day and therefore are not effective in recognizing and mitigating
risk within their assigned domains.
The author also mentions the usage of policy frameworks in his comments and
the ineffectiveness of these frameworks within organizations. However, a portion of the
overarching problem is that many enterprises do not implement frameworks for security
policies. The security policy is often a document created after a breech of security or
questionable incident has occurred and often does not address all security needs, but
rather the particular incident that previously occurred. These make shift policies are not
qualified to serve as the foundation of security that a security policy must be. The task
of creating or adopting a security framework for policy and all other components is an
effort that requires time and extreme consideration in order to be even the slightest bit
effective.
This section will continue to examine and introduce concepts for security
frameworks and architectures for eBusiness, but will primarily be focused on security
policy design and development. This thesis will continue the examination of previously
introduced security frameworks and build on the process of creating policy driven
security architectures for eBusiness. Additionally, new thoughts and examples will be
included to further substantiate the importance of security architectures and the
methodical approach in maintaining their security to address risk, threats, and
vulnerabilities.
Before the development of security policies is addressed within any framework or
model it is important for organizations to have a deep understanding of what a good
security policy is and what are the necessary ingredients for an effective policy. It is
also important to keep in mind that traditional security policies in general are lacking in
the breadth and functionality needed for an eBusiness environment. Therefore,
additional measures must be taken to generate an effective security policy for these
specific environments. This quite often should involve developing a separate policy for
eBusiness initiatives. There are many differing views on how security policies should be
developed and what exactly they should cover. This is usually dependent upon the
organization or even the developer of the policy. Below are a few thoughts from various
authors on security policies.
"Your policy document's goals should be all-encompassing
to protect the network
from any type of accidental or deliberate threat,
real or imagined. But in addition to
preventing security breaches, the security policy
should also address the issue of how
to deal with breaches if they do occur... The policy should further outline the rights and
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responsibilities of individual users, including
"ownership"
of data, accountability, and
responsibilities for security-related tasks. The document should state specifically which
users are allowed to use and access which data and equipment, what they are allowed
to do with it, and include a list of acceptable and unacceptable uses... The security
policy is typically divided into separate areas, including prevention, maintenance, and
actions taken if security breaches do occur. Furthermore, the security policy must be
written to comply with existing corporate policies and business
rules."
The above comments are certainly viable within some organizations and many of
the thoughts expressed are applicable in most enterprises. However, as was
mentioned earlier the dynamic and new requirements introduced by eBusiness often
forces companies to literally throw traditional thought processes on security policy out
the window. This is why it is recommended that new policies specific to eBusiness be
developed and introduced into those environments. For corporate policies and rules will
often be in direct contradiction to eBusiness needs and this is rightfully so as a
corporate policy usually does not address eBusiness efforts. Separate networks should
also be constructed for eBusiness within enterprises with their own governing security
policy, but this will be addressed later. It is important to recognize and complement or
enable the corporate business needs with eBusiness activities and not stray from those
goals, but in order to achieve these things eBusiness must be considered a separate
entity, as well as securing eBusiness.
"A security policy for a system is like a foreign policy for government: It defines
the aims and goals...Good policies talk to the threats. If there were no threats, there
would be no policy: Everyone could do everything... The security policy provides a
framework for selecting and implementing countermeasures against the threats... Policy
is about strategy. Or, more realistically, you can't expect the dozen or so engineers,
each of whom is in charge of security for a small portion of the system, to behave
coherently unless there is a unified policy that they are all trying to implement. A clear,
concise, coherent, and consistent policy is more likely to be
followed." 10
The above comments effectively address the issue and relevance of security
policies. The development and nurturing of security policies should and must be viewed
as a strategic initiative designed to combat traditional and new threats that exist and
attack perimeters daily. Security policies and plans are an enterprise's battle plans
against attacks and threats from enemies and adversaries. Though policies should
normally be strategic in nature and security
procedures and practices should be more
tactical, within eBusiness domains the enemy and attacks can be so
dynamic that many
policies are both tactical and strategic in mitigating risks.
Again, the approach taken in developing, implementing
and managing security
policies will differ among organizations, but
what is truly important is that policy
objectives are not ignored or neglected. Policies will be unique because the differing
eBusiness domains and systems within those domains will be unique themselves,
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therefore it is often required that security architectures be unique as well in order to
protect the enterprise it is deployed within.
The following comments demonstrate the importance of security strategy within a
framework or model. The policy development step within the PFIRES model is an
excellent example of how to get started on policy creation or updates depending on the
organization. It also is an excellent witness to the fact that security is definitely a
continuing process that must be systematically approached and expected to change. In
a sense change can be considered therapeutic to a security policy if it is justified and in
direct compliance with the overall business needs and strategies. It is often these
changes that promote and create new opportunities for conducting business. However,
these changes can also limit system functionality if new risks are identified and
considered to great to accept, and thus the functionality associated to those risks can
and probably should be eliminated.
"Policy Development Step
It is vital to develop security strategy and policy that is in line
with existing
business strategy and policy. Activities during Policy
Development assure this.
Scope will depend on whether this is the first or a repeat time through the
PFIRES model. If this is the first a security strategy will need to be created or
updated. If this is a repeat, security strategy will not
need to be updated, so
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policy changes and/or updates will be limited to those related to the change
being implemented. Bear in mind, however, that a security strategy, no matter
how brilliant, should not be thought of as permanent.
The nature of the Internet is constantly evolving; risks and threats to companies
that rely on it are constantly evolving as well. It is important to note that even if
the proposed change was rejected, Policy Assessment might have determined
that changes needed to be made based on that rejection. If that is the case
Policy Development should be executed as
well."
The above comments further demonstrate that a policy driven security framework
will be a constant process not limited to onetime policy development and
implementation. As stated above, actions taken during the policy development step will
be dependent upon whether an organization is just entering into the PFIRES model or
not. This further highlights that the model and policies within it must be frequently
revisited in order to appropriately manage security concerns.
Additionally, completely adopting the PFIRES model and expecting positive
results will require assigning time and resources to guaranteeing its success.
Enterprises that enter into the model halfheartedly may be causing more damage to
their respective security architectures than good. The subject model and most others
are detailed and in-depth and should be treated as so in order to gain the rewards and
expected results of implementing a successful security framework.
"Policy Development Methodology
Policy Development contains two sub-steps: Create/Update Security






Create/Update Security Strategy Sub-step
Security strategy is an overview of future business
direction along with the
security controls needed to support
these business functions. A security
strategy session should be held consisting
of the following tasks:
Identify future business initiatives
1
Policy Framework for Interpreting Risk in eCommerce Security
48




This session should include key management personnel not only for their
thought leadership but to gain their buy-in. Someone with security expertise and
experience with facilitating high-level executives should facilitate. Discussions
should cover the following topics:
Future business initiatives with their associated security risks
and concerns
Prioritization of business applications and processes
Prioritization of security initiatives
Current security concerns of the business
Executive input is also vital to guarantee that security strategy is aligned
with rest of the organization's business strategies. It will also ensure that security
is considered when new business capabilities and acquisitions are planned, new
alliances made, and new markets entered.
Create/Update Security Policy Sub-step
Specific tasks of this sub-step include:




Identify Areas for Security Policy looks at Policy, Risk, and Organizational
"As-is"
Assessments to gather inputs in preparation for drafting security policy.
Draft Security Policy creates the initial version of the security policy or
security policy update. The security team
should provide guidance on the context
and the content of the policy. The policy draft should include, at a minimum, the
following sections or attributes:
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Title - Provided by the security organization following a
standard format.
Version -- Version number of the document so it can be version
controlled.
Purpose
Scope and Audience -- The intended audience and the
environments to which it applies.
Overview - A briefly explanation of relevant security issues
including specific threats and vulnerabilities to consider.
Roles and Responsibilities - Define who is responsible for what
actions.
Content ~ Identify and explain all relevant information.
Reporting




- A record of the original author, authors of
revisions, and a synopsis of each revision change.
Review Security Policy ensures quality, usability and acceptance of the
policy. A small review team with user, management, and executive
representation should review it. Their comments should be directed back to the
author who will then make any updates deemed necessary.
Then the final draft is forwarded to the security organization.
Finally, the Publish Security Policy task authorizes and communicates the
policy. First, the security organization forwards the final draft to the executive
responsible for approving the policy. Once approved, the policy is then
communicated to the entire
organization." 1
The policy development step appropriately establishes differences in strategy
and policy. The previous comments serve as an excellent example of how enterprises
should approach securing their perimeters and valued assets. Depending on the
current state of an organization's security initiative it must carefully decide whether to
enter directly into policy development or update, or to reevaluate the corporate security
strategy from a higher level. Either of these steps can be valuable at appropriate times,
1
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but regardless of the time or situation when a security strategy is reviewed it is
beneficial and usually increases assurance within a security architecture.
If an organization decides that it must first and foremost review and possibly
change the current security strategy changes in business needs and goals will usually
be the cause. Within organizations that aggressively embrace eBusiness opportunities
this is especially true as traditional business needs and means of facilitating those
needs must be transformed to operate within a digital economy. The secluded worlds of
Intranets within these companies will no longer support the eBusiness endeavors to be
embarked upon. The time has come to expand and open up to a new business world.
This usually forces enterprises to adopt one or many Extranets to meet the
requirements of eBusiness and fulfill the needs of growing customer, supplier, partner,
and competitor bases. These new business needs can be the genesis of extraordinary
revenue growth and product expansion, but these advancements can also come at an
extreme cost that may not be feasible.
One can now begin to see a cause of many vulnerabilities and unacceptable
risks within the eBusiness architectures of enterprises. The aforementioned mad dash
to eBusiness gold by many organizations has caused a negligence that could cause
tremendous havoc to these same organizations. Often when the transition is being
discussed or made within infrastructures to promote eBusiness activities the question
posed is can we do it, or how do we accomplish this feat. However, the question that is
rarely asked or adequately answered is how will this change effect our current security
strategy and the processes in place to protect what is most valued. Or an even more
fundamental question is, will this new architecture for eBusiness be secure, and how.
These simple questions that are often not asked because the main focus is on
tapping into new customer bases and reaping the rewards of eCommerce should be at
the forefront of any eBusiness transitioning plans. Organizations that choose to ignore
or put aside these concerns are entering into endeavors full of havoc and turmoil. The
Internet has become a virtual playground without boundaries for crackers and hackers
alike who find numerous systems daily to compromise, and considering that literally
thousands upon thousands of new systems are being deployed daily the infinite
sandbox continues to grow for these adversaries. For many corporations that have not
experienced a devastating attack on their systems these attackers are nothing more
than a nuisance, but even these nuisances cost valuable time and money to manage,
and who can predict when a nuisance will become much more.
The importance of strategizing can never be overstated or overemphasized, as
the strategy sessions mentioned above will be the foundations of security policies and
processes. So strategy sessions should be considered an excellent
exercise in
ensuring that not only security engineers and administrators are following the same
tune, but that the entire corporation is in line with future business goals. Also what is
needed to secure these efforts and minimize risk and possibly eliminate associated
vulnerabilities.
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If an organization utilizing the PFIRES model decides that the creation or
updating of a security policy is in order it should also be handled procedurally. Quick
fixes to security policies are unacceptable and can cause negative repercussions to the
overall policy and to the system or environment that they are applied to. Security
policies should be forced to go through a detailed development or updating process that
includes reviews, sign-off, and possibly testing.
The PFIRES model calls for the identification of areas for the security policy
development or updates. These areas can come from previous assessments, reviews,
etc., as well as existing policy and procedures. However, it is important to remember
that continual assessing of security infrastructures and associated policies and
procedures greatly contributes to the success of any security effort. Therefore, it is
recommended that if an organization elects to create or update security policies that
formal vulnerability, risk, and threat analyses be conducted. This is extremely important
in guaranteeing that policy creators have the latest and most informative data on the
environment that policy is being created or updated for. Existing information and
policies are also extremely valuable and will serve as excellent resources, but may have
become outdated and many factors could and probably have changed since previous
assessment and data gathering exercises.
The outline provided by the PFIRES model for a minimum set of attributes for a
security policy should be treated as just that, a minimum set of attributes. As was
mentioned earlier security policies will and should be unique for individual organization's
employing them. The minimum attribute set may not be in-depth enough for some
enterprises and on the other hand it may be too detailed for smaller businesses. Some
of the previous comments called for security policies to be clear, concise, short, and to
the point. IT is definitely realistic to demand that policies be clear and understandable
by all within an organization. Additionally, it should be expected that security policies
are concise and direct, but the length and amount of data and effort exhausted on policy
development is totally dependent on the security and business needs of a corporation.
Limiting policy scope and depth to simplify its nature will only cause problems on down
the line, as organizations discover that issues not addressed within the policy are
definitely the first to be exploited, and will not have a formal plan of action if not included
In the policy document.
Different organizations and especially security professionals will have conflicting
thoughts on security policy development. These conflicting thoughts and methodologies
usually spawn differing templates for security policies, as well as different areas to be
covered within a policy. These differences do not necessarily make one policy creation
technique better than the other, but should increase an organization's awareness of the
many different approaches to creating security policies. Additionally, these differences
should force companies to thoroughly examine available techniques and concepts and




The process of moving business-to-business functions to an eCommerce
model typically involves linking an organization to its suppliers, manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers. In doing so, technical architectures become
increasingly complex. With this increased complexity comes a tendency for the
policy that controls this environment to become more flexible and less specific
-
possibly opening up the organization to additional
risk." 1
Below is an additional outline for a security policy for a traditional corporate
network. It demonstrates that there are bound to be differences between policy
templates and outlines. It is also important to keep in mind that most corporate security
policies do not include eBusiness activities and security needs, and this could further
substantiate that a separate and individual security policy is needed and could be
beneficial to an enterprises eBusiness security architectures.
"FUBAR's Computer User Policy
Purpose
Objectives













(generalities)- Employees (and temporary employees)
User Policy
- Contractors (subject to the policies stated above,
and in an addition)
Clarification and Descriptions of the above issues:
1
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Security of FUBAR Computing Resources
No Unlawful Use of FUBAR Computing Resources
Personal Use of FUBAR Office Productivity Software
Use of E-Mail
Use of Internet
No Right to Privacy on FUBAR Computer Resources
Violations of Computer User
Policy" 17
The policy outline above clearly demonstrates the differences that are certain to
be present among differing security policies and methodology associated with these
policies. The outline above is much more in-depth than the one presented by the
PFIRES model and is more specific to networking and computer usage. This again
illustrates that the overall concentration of a security policy will be totally dependant
upon the organization, as well as what is intended to be protected. In the instance
above it is clear that the corporate network and the nodes attached to the network are
considered extremely valuable and need to be protected. In the case of the PFIRES
model if the assumption is made that the framework will be implemented as an addition
to existing policy to cover eBusiness activities the high level outline is sufficient as the
low level issues may have already been covered in earlier documents.
It is also feasible for an organization to have separate documents for individual
areas of security. For, example it might not be a bad idea for a company to have
physical security, operational security, network security, communications systems
security, application security, Internet security, information security, etc.; or some
combination of the previous forms of security. Separating these functions out makes it
easier to assign domain experts to particular areas for individual policy development.
This also increases the probability of the document being correct and deployable after
the initial development activities.
The following section will continue to build upon the security life cycle approach
and will look at the second phase of a previously introduced model. The next section
will continue to focus on policy creation and associated tasks
that occur after
assessments have been conducted and analyzed. New concepts will be introduced that
may conflict with the overall thought process of the PFIRES model,
but readers are
reminded to have an open mind about security for eBusiness architectures,
as they will
differ sometimes greatly and often times in a miniscule way,
but they will definitely be
different. So it is important to have an open mind when seeking solutions, because a
solution that worked yesterday on a similar system may
or may not be the answer for
the system being addressed today. It is totally
dependent on the environment, the
17
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organization, the business needs and strategy, associated risks, vulnerabilities, threats,
and exactly to what degree these are acceptable. Thus, it will never be a one size fits
all situation.
"Design
Design is where details describing the network and its contents become a
comprehensive security policy document encompassing guidelines for policy
implementation at the business unit level and network device configurations that support
and enforce the policy. As part of this step, the organization needs to make a
fundamental decision - bring network security in-house, or use managed security
services through an outsourcing model.
Some organizations will opt for local control. Others will prefer to let someone
else handle the workload and liability. Either option, however, requires proper
assessment and design for any reasonable expectation of success.
The first priority of the design stage is to create standardized levels of security
service based on the data gathered in the assessment stage. Access privileges and
trusted relationships between hardware, software and staff must be matched with these
services. It can get complicated. Individuals or systems may have different levels of
security for different sets of similar data. Likewise, the same individuals or systems may
require different levels of security for different business requirements or network
management events. Data stored at multiple locations on the network may have
different security needs dictated by the various locations.
In the end, the design process delivers a web of interrelationships between
information, systems, users and tightly defined levels of security needs. Based on this
data, it becomes possible to start designing a security architecture that transparently
supports the
organization'
s overall business strategy.
The next step is to define implementation guidelines
- the standards by which an
element of the security policy will be judged as compliant or not. This process should
define the following:
Is this an allowable event? On which systems and under which circumstances?
Should this event trigger an alarm?Who should receive it? What action should be
taken?
Is this vulnerability allowed? On which systems and under which circumstances?
Should this event trigger an alarm? Who should receive it? What action should be
taken?
Delineate chains of command for incident escalation
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Define the requirements for reporting
- who should receive which reports, in what
format, at what time intervals
Once these requirements/relationships have been correlated into data, it is time
to build a shopping list of hardware and software. The implementation guidelines lead to
lists of detailed configuration guidelines, which in turn determine the devices and
applications needed to establish and manage the security policy. These implementation
and configuration guidelines also provide the baseline metrics by which security
assessment and intrusion detection applications evaluate policy compliance once the
system has been deployed. In other words, a well-designed security management
system limits its scope to specific operations on specific network segments. The result
is faster security management response time, focused reporting and limited effects on
network
performance." 12
The above comments place an extreme importance on the ability of a security
policy to be enforceable on the network via security and other technological tools. This
is an extremely important consideration since components within a policy that cannot be
implemented are useless. It does not matter if the targeted network and environment
can not support the policy's expectations or if the technology does not exist to be
implemented, if the solution is not feasible it should not be apart of an organizations
security policy.
The security framework above also points out and gives an enterprise the choice
of electing to handle their own security needs or employing an outside agency to
implement and manage their security architecture. Again it is totally dependent upon
the individual organization and the existing skill sets available for the security endeavor.
Companies should not be too proud to realize if they do not possess the required
resources to handle all of their security needs. It is important to put pride aside and
seek out appropriate help if a company wants a security job done right and efficiently at
the same time. However, it is also important for organizations to keep in mind that
employing an outside agency for security matters introduces an entirely new risk into
the security equation that must be analyzed and thoroughly examined as not to
introduce increased vulnerability into a system or domain. Corporations should not
expect to totally wipe their hands clean of security issues once it is outsourced. The
effort involved in managing outsourced solutions is probably more
intensive and
demanding than in-house activities. Additionally, if these efforts are not properly
handled enterprises can be made to be at the mercy of these outsourced entities, as
they handle all security and will definitely know the ins and outs
of the organization they
are working for. It is without a doubt a very tricky situation,
but if approached and
managed properly can be extremely effective
and beneficial to an organization's
security needs and the facilitating of business
activities.
The previous comments state that the initial responsibility to be addresses within
the design phase is to establish standardized levels of security within the subject
domain of operation. Creating these security levels is a vital part
of establishing an
12
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effective security platform, as these will contribute to access control requirements, as
well as other security properties within a system. As stated above establishing levels of
security and Multi Level Security (MLS) in general is an extremely complicated task that
requires a large amount of consideration in order to be properly implemented.
Implementing security levels and possibly categories for data, users, accessibility
rights, manipulation rights, etc. in order to be properly instituted must be based upon the
selection and implementation of one or more of many standard concepts of access
control. The type of access control deployed within an organization for the protection of
eBusiness assets plays a tremendous role in the types of security levels that can be
applied. Additionally, if a security architecture requires the categorization or
compartmentalization of data greater thought must be given as to what access control
methodology is appropriate. Listed below are brief descriptions of the commonly used
access control methods within the computing industry. These concepts have been
utilized for some time and continue to evolve and mature. However, these are not the
only types of access control, as new methods are increasingly popping up as
technology continues to advance, but these are the most commonly used and
recognizable.
"Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
As the name implies, the Mandatory Access Control defines an imposed access
control level.
MAC is defined as follows in the Handbook of Information Security Management:
With mandatory controls, only administrators and not owners of resources may
make decisions that bear on or derive from policy. Only an administrator may
change the category of a resource, and no one may grant a right of access that is
explicitly forbidden in the access control policy.
It is important to note that mandatory controls are prohibitive (i.e., all that is not
expressly permitted is forbidden), not permissive. Only within that context do
discretionary controls operate, prohibiting still more access with the same
exclusionary principle.
In this type of control system decisions are based on privilege (clearance) of
subject (user) and sensitivity (classification) of object (file). It requires labelling.
Discretionary Access Control
DAC is defined as follows in the Handbook of Information Security Management:
Access controls that are not based on the policy are characterised as
discretionary controls by the U.S. government and as need-to-know controls by
other organizations. The latter term connotes least privilege those who may
read an item of data are precisely those whose tasks entail the need.
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Discretionary access controls can extend beyond limiting which subjects can gain
what type of access to which objects. Administrators can limit access to certain
times of day or days of the week. Typically, the period during which access would
be permitted is 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Monday through Friday. Such a limitation is
designed to ensure that access takes place only when supervisory personnel are
present, to discourage unauthorised use of data. Further,
subjects'
rights to
access might be suspended when they are on vacation or leave of absence.
When subjects leave an organization altogether, their rights must be terminated
rather than merely suspended.
Under this type of control, the owner determines who has access and what
privilege they have.
Lattice Based Access Control
The Lattice Based Access Control model was developed to deal mainly with
information flow in computer systems. Information flow is clearly central to
confidentiality but to some extent it also applies to integrity. The basic work in
this area was done around 1970 and was driven mostly by the defense sector.
Information flow in computer systems is concerned with flow from one security
class (also called security label) to another. These controls are applied to
objects. An object is a container of information, and an object can be a directory
or file.
In summary, this is a model that deals with confidentiality and to limited extent
integrity.
Rule-Based Access Control
Rule based access control is based on a specific profile for each user.
Information can be easily changed for only one user but this scheme may
become a burden in a very large environment.
A rule-based access control unit will intercept every request to the server and
compare the source specific access conditions with the rights of the user in order
to make an access decision. A good example could be a firewall. Here a set of
rules defined by the network administrator is recorded in a file. Every time a
connection is attempted (incoming or outgoing), the firewall software checks the
rules file to see if the connection is allowed. If it is not, the firewall closes the
connection.
The RFC 2828 - Internet Security Glossary talks about Rule Based Security
Policy:
A security policy based on global rules
imposed for all users. These rules usually
rely on comparison of the sensitivity
of the resource being accessed and the
possession of corresponding attributes of users,
a group of users, or entities
acting on behalf of users.
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Role-Based Access Control
Role based access control (RBAC) is a technology that is attracting increasing
attention, particularly for commercial applications, because of its potential for
reducing the complexity and cost of security administration in large networked
applications.
Role based access control (RBAC) is an alternative to traditional discretionary
(DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC) policies. The principle motivation
behind RBAC is the desire to specify and enforce enterprise-specific security
policies in a way that maps naturally to an organization's structure. Traditionally,
managing security has required mapping an organization's security policy to a
relatively low-level set of controls, typically access control lists.
With role-based access control, access decisions are based on the roles that
individual users have as part of an organization. Users take on assigned roles
(such as doctor, nurse, teller, manager). The process of defining roles should be
based on a thorough analysis of how an organization operates and should
include input from a wide spectrum of users in an organization.
Access rights are grouped by role name, and the use of resources is restricted to
individuals authorized to assume the associated role. For example, within a
hospital system the role of doctor can include operations to perform diagnosis,
prescribe medication, and order laboratory tests; and the role of researcher can
be limited to gathering anonymous clinical information for studies.
The use of roles to control access can be an effective means for developing and
enforcing enterprise-specific security policies, and for streamlining the security
management process.
With RBAC, security is managed at a level that corresponds closely to the
organization's structure. Each user is assigned one or more roles, and each role
is assigned one or more privileges that are permitted to users in that role. Roles
can be hierarchical. For example, some roles in a hospital may be health care
provider, nurse, and doctor. The doctor role may include all privileges available to
the nurse role, which in turn includes all the privileges available to the health care
provider role. Security administration with RBAC consists of determining the
operations that must be executed by persons in particular jobs, and assigning
employees to the proper roles. Complexities introduced by mutually exclusive
roles or the RBAC software handles role hierarchies, making security
administration easier.
Access Control Lists
A method of coordinating access to resources based
on the listing of permitted
(or denied) users, network addresses or groups for each resource.
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List of subjects authorized access to some objects.
In security, a list of entities, together with their access rights, that are authorized
to access a resource. Mechanism implementing discretionary and/or mandatory
access control between subjects and objects.
" 18
As stated earlier the selection of an appropriate access control scheme can be a
difficult task, but it is extremely important to the success of implementing security levels
and associations. Selecting appropriate access control systems like selecting most
components of a security architecture will be completely dependent upon the
environment and its associated requirements. The list above demonstrates the vast
variety of solutions to choose from, and the list did not include Context Based Access
Control (CBAC), Low Watermark Mandatory Access Control (LOMAC), FLASK, etc. So
there are many factors to consider when selecting access control mechanisms, as well
as selecting and implementing levels of security in order to achieve any measurable
success.
The security model above does an excellent job of illustrating the detailed and
methodical exercises that must be conducted in creating a formidable security policy.
The creation of a security policy is far more than simply drafting a document and
publishing it within an organization. Extreme thought must be given to the impact of the
policy, as well as implementation concerns and issues. Many organizations construct
fly-by-night policies simply to say they have one in place, and in many instances the
policy and the actual security architecture are complete contradictions of each other.
Organizations should take heed to Bruce Schneier and treat security policies like foreign
policies for governments. Within some enterprises these documents are just that crucial
and are expected to protect corporate assets on a daily basis, whether they are
eBusiness assets or traditional commerce valuables they still must be guarded, and that
protection begins with an adequate security policy.
The questions posed for generating a security policy above can also be
considered a high level set, though they are more detailed than the PFIRES format
these questions still may not cover every aspect of an individual companies security
architecture. Many corporations may elect to utilize a combination of security
frameworks and models to accomplish their goals. This is totally acceptable, but
organizations must be careful to watch for conflicting interests within differing models,
as the authors of each may have conflicting views on security policy and security
in
general.
The following section will take another look at the processes involved in security
engineering. It will continue the previous discussion on the life cycle of security
engineering and proceed to develop additional thought
on security after risk has been
assessed and thoroughly evaluated. Again, readers are
reminded that this framework is
not specific to eBusiness environments, but certainly can be deployed within them. It is
1
Access Control Systems &Methodology
60
considered an engineering discipline specific to security issues and concepts and
provides excellent insight into how security matters should be assessed and solutions
designed, implemented, and managed to achieve success on security projects.
"Engineering
Security engineering, like other engineering disciplines, is a process that
proceeds through concept, design, implementation, test, deployment, operation,
maintenance, and decommission. Throughout this process, security engineers
must work closely with the other parts the system engineering team. The
SSE-
CMM emphasizes that security engineers are part of a larger team and need to
coordinate their activities with engineers from other disciplines. This helps to
ensure that security is an integral part of the larger process, and not a separate
and distinct activity.
Using the information from the risk process described above, and other
information about system requirements, relevant laws, and policies, security
engineers work with the customer to identify security needs. Once needs are
identified, security engineers identify and track specific requirements.
Risk
1 r







The process of creating solutions to security
problems generally involves
identifying possible alternatives and then evaluating
the alternatives to determine which
is the most promising. The difficulty in integrating this activity with the rest of the
engineering process is that the
solutions cannot be selected on security considerations
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alone. Rather, a wide variety of other considerations, including cost; performance,
technical risk, and ease of use must be addressed.
Typically, these decisions should be captured to minimize the need to revisit
issues. The analyses produced also form a significant basis for assurance
efforts.
Later in the lifecycle, the security engineer is called on to ensure that products
and systems are properly configured in relation to the perceived risks, ensuring
that new risks do not make the system unsafe to
operate." 13
The above comments appropriately emphasize the importance of integrating
security into the life cycle of all systems development. This is true of client/server-
based systems, web-based systems, and eCommerce systems alike. It makes
absolutely no difference what type of system is involved it is absolutely vital that security
requirements are considered and addressed throughout the entire life cycle. It is also
extremely important that security engineers and specialists work closely with systems
architects and engineers alike to design secure reliable systems that function properly
and minimize risk, as well as negate vulnerabilities.
Many organizations that architect and integrate systems are skilled I the design
and engineering work, but consideration of security are often last or not considered until
an incident arises. This is simply unacceptable within a digital networked economy,
where the slightest incident can cost a corporation millions of dollars. Therefore, as the
comments above suggest security should be design into a system from the very
beginning. This design should also encompass the aforementioned assessments and
risk analyses that are needed to determine what to protect and in what manner.
Organizations must begin to realize the importance of implementing security early in a
program or system design or be faced with increasing consequences and loss, because
the stakes are certainly high within eBusiness and are continuing to rise.
Next, this thesis will examine a model for secure eBusiness. It does not
necessarily have to be considered a framework or life cycle, but it certainly illustrates
the needed components of a secure eBusiness architecture. While not a life cycle per
say the model can certainly be implemented within other life cycles in order to gain
added assurance. The components within the following model are pure necessities
within an eBusiness environment. If a framework deployed within a security
architecture for eBusiness does not employ these concepts and components then the
overall stability of the architecture is definitely lacking and should adopt additional
features to cover those inadequate areas.
'
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"Secure E-business follows a simple set of principles:
Understand your networks, and the business objectives they support. Some
systems and information resources are more valuable than others, and not all of
it needs to be protected equally.
Develop a thorough and achievable security policy, implement it and update it at
regular intervals. Use this process to streamline and automate operations and
enhance cross-platform integration and distribution.
Enhance point solutions such as firewalls, authentication and encryption with
adaptive technology that maximizes effectiveness and helps prevent premature
obsolescence.
Purchase infrastructure products and assessment tools from different
manufacturers. An independent source of assessment products is much more
likely to provide an unbiased evaluation of overall E-business security
performance.
Consider outsourcing some or all security management operations. Doing so
allows an organization to focus internal resources more directly on core business
competencies.
Keep it simple. "Shun complexity. Set dirt-simple policies and use measures
that are invisible to end-users. Obsess about ease-of-management to reduce the
risk of
misconfiguration"





Many organizations already have some form of security
policy. However,
pressure from users demanding enhanced capabilities and limited staff resources
often result in a significant gap between the policy and its
actual implementation.
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This security gap is where a small oversight can lead to a huge problem. Secure
E-business helps measure and control this
gap." 19
The statements above are probably true to some extent within all organizations
regardless of how adequate their security systems and policies are. The fact is that
business requirements change so rapidly and frequently that the detailed process of
updating and possibly creating adequate security policies is to time consuming to
embark upon before necessary changes are made for business. This should definitely
not be the case, but it is however the nature of business and it is important to remember
that the needs of the business and established goals will always come first and
foremost, as without business there would be no need for security measures.
"Secure E-business consists of five closely related functions:
Policy compliance and vulnerability management
Intrusion detection and response
Enterprise Security Management and Decision Support
Managed Security Services (outsourcing)





The model above for secure eBusiness is an adequate framework for securing
architectures for eBusiness. It effectively covers the most important aspects of securing
eBusiness domains. Additionally, though the model is not considered a life cycle it
adequately addresses the important phases and steps within a life cycle approach. It
takes into consideration risk, vulnerability, threats, and associated assessments that
must be considered before security policies or controls can be implemented.
Additionally, it gives considerable attention to the gaps that often exist between a
security policy document and the actual implementation of security mechanisms and
processes.
The cornerstones of security! Without them no security solution would have a
stable enough foundation to support it. Each of the cornerstones is extremely important
and none should be neglected or ignored. Choosing to or inadvertently neglecting even
one of these important concepts creates vulnerabilities and holes that could cause
enormous risk as well as threats to a system or architecture. While each of these
components is extremely important by itself it is the security policy that provides an
even deeper bedrock foundation for these cornerstones. An effective security policy
should act as the glue or a net to bring all of the cornerstones together and operate in
accordance to achieve one common goal, securing the enterprise it they have been
delegated to protect. So it holds true that the security policy definitely is the foundation
of all security efforts, and if this is not true within a particular company then the security
architectures that are deployed are probably inadequate and contain vulnerabilities just
waiting to be exploited.
Placing the Stones
'The defender's military advantage comes from two broad strengths: the ability to
quickly react to an attack, and the ability to control the terrain.
The first strength is probably the most important; a defender can more quickly shift
forces to resupply existing forces, shore up defense where it is needed, and
counterattack. I've written extensively about how this applies to computer security: how
detection and response are critical, the need for trained experts to quickly analyze and
react to attacks, and the importance of vigilance.
The defender's second strength also gives him a strong advantage. He has
better knowledge of the terrain: where the good hiding places are, where the mountain
passes are, how to sneak through the caves. This provides
the defender with an
enormous advantage. He can modify the terrain: building castles or surface-to-air
missile batteries, digging trenches or tunnels, and erecting
guard towers or pillboxes.
And he can choose the terrain on which to stand and defend: behind the stone wall,
atop the hill, on the far side of the bridge, in the
dense jungle. The defender can use




On the Internet, this second advantage is one that network defenders seldom
take advantage of: knowledge of the network. The network administrator knows exactly
how his network is built (or, at least, he should), what it is supposed to do, and how it is
supposed to do it. Any attacker except a knowledgeable insider has no choice but to
stumble around, trying this and that, trying to figure out what's where and who's
connected to whom. And it's about time we exploited this advantage.
Traditional computer security has been static: install a firewall, configure a PKI,
add access-control measures, and you're done. Real security is dynamic. The defense
has to be continuously vigilant, always ready for the attack. The defense has to be able
to detect attacks quickly, before serious damage is done. And the defense has to be
able to respond to attacks effectively, repelling the attacker and restoring order.
This kind of defense is possible in computer networks. It starts with effective
sensors: firewalls, well-audited servers and routers, intrusion-detection products,
network burglar alarms. But it also includes people: trained security experts that can
quickly separate the false alarms from the real attacks, and who know how to respond.
This is security through process. This is security that recognizes that human
intelligence is vital for a strong defense, and that automatic software programs just don't
cut
it." 20
Attempts and efforts made by enterprises to defend their perimeters and
networks within those perimeters often neglect or fail to utilize the inherent advantages
mentioned above. Possessing the ability to quickly and aggressively react to an attack
or potential threat is extremely important in securing eBusiness architectures and the
customers, suppliers, and partners that interact within them. Additionally, being
thoroughly educated on the terrain in which a security group within an enterprise is
protecting is literally priceless and extremely difficult at the same time, as conditions and
requirements can change daily within some organizations. Still taking full advantage of
both of these aspects could possibly mean the difference between an attempted attack
being successful or being thwarted by designated security strategies.
Knowledge and utilization of the terrain and effective incident response strategies
are both vital features of an adequate security architecture and must be implemented in
conjunction with stern security mechanisms. Both of these potential advantages for
defenders of the enterprise should be given ample consideration when implementing
the cornerstones of security. Policy implementation, as well as the institution of security
mechanisms should be preceded by intense reconnaissance and investigation of the
domains in which they are being deployed to protect in order to effectively deter and
defend against imminent threat. The cornerstones though extremely important are
useless if not applied correctly and in a manner that
will have a positive effect for an
enterprises security architecture. The
implementation phase of any framework
designed for security or security policy
development should address the dos and don'ts
of deploying security mechanisms within a designated security
architecture.
20
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Additionally, those mechanisms must comply and complement the security policy that
they were selected to enforce.
"Deliver Phase
Now the policy can be implemented. The Deliver phase consists of two steps:
Controls Definition and Controls Implementation.
Controls Definition Step
Controls are practices, procedures or mechanisms that reduce security risks, and
this step defines those needed to meet the requirements of the security policy. In
essence these controls form the security
infrastructure- technology, processes,
and organizational security components.
Scope
The Controls Definition step is motivated by the necessity to accurately and
efficiently fulfill the requirements set forth by the policy. Therefore its scope
includes producing a specific implementation
plan for the infrastructure to assure
effectively building and configurating the necessary controls.
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Step Methodology
Controls Definition consists of four sub-steps: Design Infrastructure, Determine
Controls, Evaluate Solutions, and Select Controls. These sub-steps are





The Deliver phase within the PFIRES security model is where organizations
begin to see the actual fruits of earlier labors. Assessments will now supply security
architects and integrators alike with vital data on the security needs and expectations of
the new or updated infrastructure that is being designed and implemented. Continued
requirements gathering activities are important in order to map the requirements defined
in the security policy to the design of the associated security architecture, as well as the
selection and implementation of security products and processes and procedures. The
methodical approach of the PFIRES framework nicely ties the activities of the Deliver
phase closely to previous and future phases in order to assure that every area is
covered and is in direct correlation with each other.
The sub-steps within the controls definition procedure are extremely important
tasks that should be headed and controlled by highly talented and qualified staff
representatives. Designing a security infrastructure, determining control mechanisms,
the thorough evaluation of possible solutions, and the selection and implementation of
specific control mechanisms are the activities that combine to create the adequate
security perimeters and tactics to protect
corporate networks and assets. These tasks
should be given the utmost attention, time, and consideration in order to be completed
and handled correctly.
This is so important, because many organizations may only get
one chance to do
it right, as a devastating incident could spell the end
of security measures and possibly
the end of business in general. This is especially true within
eBusiness domains that
rapidly change and are overcome by startups and
new comers. A simple mistake in a
security architecture or a flaw in one of the
components of an infrastructure that could
1
Policy Framework for Interpreting Risk in eCommerce Security
68
lead to the loss or manipulation of data could be totally disastrous for organizations who
rely solely on electronic data and interchange for survival.
The infrastructure design step is especially critical to the success of all security
efforts and initiatives. It will take an extremely adequate and strong architectural design
to defend the infrastructure of any organization, particularly for eBusiness initiatives.
Additionally, the infrastructure design must be able to facilitate the best available
components to secure the infrastructure. The architecture must be compatible and
adaptable to current and anticipated changes in network, system, application, and
personnel functionality.
The architecting of systems in general is a highly respected and difficult task in
itself, but attempting to design security architectures is even more thought provoking
and painstaking, as the security architect must deal with what is already present.
Whether that is a bad system architecture, unrealistic goals, unacceptable risk,
unexplainable vulnerabilities, and usually a lack of general understanding of what the
security architect is attempting to achieve.
Designing secure infrastructures can definitely be a daunting task, but designing
security architectures for eBusiness can sometimes seem impossible. The reason for
this difficulty is that as organizations continue to embrace the concepts and ideals of
eBusiness it becomes increasingly clear that changes are inevitable. Often these
changes can be somewhat revolutionary and can transform corporations literally
overnight.
However, as more and more companies extend their networks and create and
participate within Extranets, the fundamental design rules and concepts of operations
have been based on traditional network design and the thought process of building or
increasing the One Big Network paradigm.
"One Big Network is a seductive vision to network designers, network users, and
business executives alike. One Big Network will
- in theory
- allow new and better
business interactions with suppliers, with business customers, and with end consumers.
Everyone connected to the One Big Network can
- in theory
-
reap great benefits at
minimal infrastructure cost. Electronic business-to-business and electronic-commerce
will be - in theory
- ubiquitous... However, one critical element has been left out of this
brave new world:
security." 15
The inherent problem with One Big Network is that as more and more segments
and functionality within those segments are added the burden of securing the one
network increases tremendously and usually becomes a management
nightmare. This
approach also increases asset vulnerability, as corporate assets are placed in danger
by the increase in accessibility forced by the addition of new ventures and the




traditional corporate network and every new addition is naturally directly attached to the
internal network, thus increasing associated risks and vulnerabilities.
While many organizations have grown fond of the idea of deploying Extranets for
new and exciting endeavors, particularly eBusiness efforts the methodology in which
these Extranets are implemented are still following the One Big Network paradigm.
Although they may be segmented from the corporate LAN or WAN they usually do not
assign the appropriate security measures in order to ensure that threats that exist and
are bound to increase within Extranets do not find themselves infiltrating the corporate
backbone.
Extranets designated for eBusiness are especially an extreme risk as they invite
and welcome outsiders to traverse their domains. Constant and extreme traffic is
definitely good for eBusiness when it is legitimate customers, suppliers, or partners
accessing the Extranet. However, assuring that only legitimate entities are roving the
network from day to day is almost an impossibility. Additionally, guaranteeing that
illegitimate users are not and will not attempt to penetrate the internal security
architecture and gain access to the enterprise network and assets is an even greater
challenge that usually is not conquered.
So what is the proposed solution? The utilization of Extranets is highly
recommended, but these Extranets should be treated as enclaves and made to adapt to
the methodologies associated with secure enclaves. The comments below further
explain the concept and should help readers conceptualize the idea of enclaves, as well
as the benefits they offer.
"The Extranet model invokes an architecture that has security as its first
objective. It means identifying what an enterprise genuinely cares about: what it lives or
dies by. It defines critical and securable components and isolates them into protected
enclaves. Access between enclaves and the enterprise is managed by network
guardians. Within enclaves, the security objective is to apply traditional controls
consistently and well... This restructuring can reduce some types of
network security
threats by orders of magnitude. Taken to the extreme, all business-to-business
interactions pass through
enclaves."15
The comments above provide a high level overview of the effectiveness of
Extranets utilized with an enclave architectural approach. Enclaves permit and facilitate
the usage of external networks for eBusiness and other initiatives that function via the
Internet or any public network. However, although
enclaves can be adequate solutions
for these environments they must be accurately deployed so
the risk associated with
these domains does not spill over into the Intranet or corporate LAN of specific
enterprises. Thus, allowing organizations to accept and
incur the risks of eBusiness,
but not jeopardize the corporate jewels in the process; a factor that many unsuccessful
new economy endeavors have neglected to
compensate for. This factor is also one that
could have saved many eBusinesses a lot
of pain and heartache.
15
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"Design Infrastructure Sub-step
In this sub-step, the requirements from the Plan phase are used to design a high-
level security infrastructure containing technical, procedural, and organizational
components.
The technical component will have several layers - application, network, and
operating system. Each layer will need controls to protect against different types
of threats and to provide multi-layered protection. The key is to meet the
following security principles:
Identification -- the ability to identify participants in a system
Authentication -- the ability to verify identification of system participants
Authorization ~ the ability to limit the scope of access to information
resources for individual participants (users or processes)




providing assurance that information stored and processed cannot
be altered accidentally or intentionally, and that information received has not
been manipulated or corrupted in transit
Availability
--
providing assurances that the information resources will be
available as expected and service levels can be met
Non-Repudiation ~ providing a mechanism to verify that a transaction has
occurred
These principles can be implemented at any or all of these three layers,
depending on the strength of the control needed.
Application layer controls will vary from application to application. However,
reuse is possible and highly encouraged. For example, rather than requiring
separate authentication for each application, many eCommerce companies are
leveraging a single source of authentication, such as a
PKI or a WAC (Web-
based Access Control), over several applications.
At the network layer, a network diagram is created or reviewed to
provide for
proper segmentation and traffic control. Typically organizations have at least
three separate regions of their network: an untrusted zone
(connected directly to
the Internet), a semi-trusted zone (containing some publicly
accessible
resources), and a trusted zone (containing private
resources). Network
segmentation is achieved through a variety of mechanisms, including firewalls
and routers.
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Organizations with more advanced architectures or more stringent security
requirements may consider further network segmentation for specific needs.
The operating system layer requires advanced authentication and authorization
controls for operating system level access. Some operating systems have built-in
controls, therefore influencing platform choice. Otherwise they can be added to
any platform through an add-on package.
The procedural component should include processes and procedures necessary
to support the security infrastructure, as well as adding controls to business
processes. Some of the procedural design cannot be completed until individual
controls have been selected and implemented, or until the business processes
have been completely defined.
Therefore, the importance of this sub-step is primarily planning to assure the right
processes are considered even though the design is not complete. Finally, the
organizational component will include processes and procedures that support
both the security infrastructure and the business
architecture." 1
The step covered above within the PFIRES model is an extremely important step
in securing an eBusiness architecture and may be considered by many to be the most
important and vital to the success of a security project. Within this phase the
appropriate personnel must design and possibly implement a formidable security
architecture for the enterprise or an individual initiative. The controls and mechanisms
to be utilized must be thoroughly evaluated, selected, and tested in order to ensure
success.
Architecting systems and solutions in general are highly valued and difficult
tasks, and architecting security systems can be an even more trying effort especially for
an eBusiness environment. These efforts require one leader or chief architect to
guarantee consensus on architectural designs and to ensure that the development of
these architectures are going and keep in the right direction. However, though a sole
leader is needed it will take a group of skilled individuals to ensure total success.
Just as in systems architecture, security architecture initiatives should involve
committees or architectural boards for large, enterprise security concerns as well as
important strategic efforts involving security. Individuals who should participate in these
collaborations should include but not be limited to Information Systems Security Officers
(ISSOs), Chief Information Officers (ClOs), network architects and administrators,
heads of incident response teams, and various other participants depending on the
situation. The important factor to remember here is that all parties who will have a stake
in the well-being of a security
architecture once it is fielded should be involved with the
design of the architecture and the associated committees and boards.
Though many
people may be involved it must still be
established that the security authority for the
enterprise is the head of these initiatives and should be
treated and behave as the
1
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leader of the design efforts for a security architecture, although his/her role may change
as implementation begins.
The thought process behind establishing committees for the design of security
architectures is primarily to ensure that no factors or important features are overlooked
or simply ignored. The final architecture must include networking considerations,
business processes; enterprise strategic growth concerns, of course security
considerations, management and administration plans, and may other factors. While
security architects may be highly skilled and capable of handling it all by themselves,
their main concern should be the security of the system or domain the architecture is
targeted for and the other issues should not dominate time away for thoughts and
efforts of security. Therefore, it is imperative that others with expertise in the various
areas contribute and decrease the load of the lead architect. Teamwork is always the
way!
The PFIRES model is very thorough in its discussion of areas that must be
covered within the architectural design of a security infrastructure. However, one area
that it does not cover is the security of actual data while stored on corporate databases
and while in transit. It is important to secure systems and architectures by means of a
layering approach or defense in depth strategies that cover every possible aspect of
security and work toward eliminating all vulnerabilities within these systems. Though
the PFIRES model addresses Operating System (OS) security it does speak to security
measures for the actual data that resides in databases running on OSs. This
component of a security architecture is extremely vital in defending against attackers
and threats. As all security systems are penetrable but once an adversary has
breached security and reached the data they are after if they cannot do anything with it
its useless and therefore not a threat to the company in their hands.
Recently more concentration is being placed on the securing of data both while it
is inactive and active. All organizations should encrypt all corporate data whether it
resides in databases, on desktops, laptops, etc. The data should be able to protect
itself if perimeter forces are compromised. More organizations are realizing this
important trait of security and are beginning to encrypt data more frequently. This
however is not the only alternative and should not be the only measure taken.
With the more frequent usage of data within corporations and among business
partners and consumers alike the need to better protect data has arrived. Frequently
organizations interact with many different companies and exchange vital,
sensitive
information among each other. This corporate data
specific in nature to individual
organizations must not be compromised or viewed by unauthorized persons. Therefore,
the need definitely exists for a categorization or security
level schema to ensure that
data is only accessible by appropriate people.
This need has begun to be realized and the industry is now seeing products
appear that specifically deal with this
issue. The labeling of data with important access
information is a revolutionary way of ensuring that only
authorized people and
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organizations are granted access to specific information. Data labeling facilitates the
categorization of data and the ability to associate security levels and access rights to
the information. This provides enterprises with the functionality to separate differing
data and guarantee that it will not fall into the wrong hands or even be accessible by
unauthorized persons or systems. It is also equally important to provide adequate
security for data while in transit in actively pursuing a defense in depth philosophy.
Inserting the same labels onto data packets before they are placed onto the
network is also an important part of a layered data security approach. The labels within
the packets contains the access rights, associated security levels, categorization, and
other key information used to protect data. These labeled packets also ensure that
nodes on an internal network or outside are authorized to receive packets in
transmission. They also establish exactly what data is accessible and to what extent.
Applying security measures onto every layer of a system or within every domain of a
network further assures that the security architecture is solid and every nook has been
covered. Without this defense in depth or layered security approach vulnerabilities are
destined to remain unaddressed and exploitable.
"Controls Implementation Step
This step implements the controls selected in the prior step. Activities include
building, testing, and implementing the final security infrastructure.
Scope
The scope of this step will vary widely depending on the controls. If the security
infrastructure is being built from scratch to support a new business capability or
market offering, then the Controls Implementation step may be very complex and
last several months. If the security infrastructure is being slightly modified to
adapt to a new threat, a few days may suffice.
Step Methodology
This step is executed through four
sub-steps: Create Implementation Plan, Build,
Test, and Pilot and Deployment. These sub-steps have some
amount of overlap;
Build will not be complete until Test has verified that it meets requirements. The
infrastructure is typically piloted in a limited environment,
then deployed to the
organization; however, depending on the scope of the solution,
a pilot may not be
warranted. During deployment, once the
infrastructure is in place in the
"live"
environment, a final risk assessment
should be performed to assure that all
known threats have been addressed and the solution is
secure."
The methodology and procedures
involved in the controls implementation step
illustrate an in-depth procedural and meticulous approach to deploying
a security
architecture. It continues to exercise the life cycle
method of developing and
implementing systems in a careful manner.
The subject step is extremely cautious in
introducing the finished architecture into a
production environment until it has been
thoroughly tested and meets the
approval of existing authorities.
The illustration below
1
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further demonstrates the methods used within each sub-step to ensure success and






Probably the most impressive feature of the aforementioned step is its procedural
nature in striving for a successful implementation of the security infrastructure
previously designed. The fact that the model calls for
implementation planning
suggests that the task at hand will not be a simple one, and this usually is exactly the
case. Failure to adequately plan for major security implementations can cause
detriment to not only new security designs and measures, but also
to existing
infrastructure components. Therefore it is extremely important that every possible
scenario be considered and properly planned for in order to be prepared
in the event
that the unthinkable does occur.
Additionally, an important effort that many organizations often
neglect to take
advantage of is the opportunity to pilot newly designed security
architectures within
development environments. The ability to deploy a security design within a
targeted no-
production environment before releasing it to the masses is
a benefit that is
extraordinarily valuable. Pilot
implementations allow all involved with the security
project to evaluate the architecture and perform analyses
without interrupting the daily
flow of business operations or endangering present security by introducing
untested
feature sets.
Also the above step addresses the
importance of reassessing the security
infrastructure once it has been deployed. Frequent, periodic
assessments and security
scans should be conducted long after the final testing
for deployment has been
conducted This will ensure that as the architecture
matures that new vulnerabilities
and risks are properly handled.
Without this continual monitoring and
pressure for
improvement security structures can
become weak as technology advances and new
threats are created.
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The following comments provide more thought on the deployment and
implementation of security architectural designs and processes.
"Deploy
Deployment, which is where most organizations currently concentrate their
security efforts, is actually the simplest and most straightforward aspect of
security management. Since deployment is much like launching any other online
initiative, most organizations already have a structure in place for testing and
implementation. Unfortunately, this same familiarity leads many organizations to
follow only this step, giving short shrift to assessment, design and
management/support. In essence, the security management process is
disregarded once deployment is complete. This narrow view of information
security can easily lead to an inefficient, inadequate or under-performing network
security infrastructure.
Education is a critical element for successful deployment. In fact, deployment
provides the best opportunity to educate the entire range of staff affected by the
security policy, including how it benefits both individuals and the organization in
technical and financial terms. This last step is frequently overlooked, but it often
becomes the determinant factor in whether a security implementation thrives or
fails.
Deployment begins with the purchase of hardware and software, as dictated by
the plan created in the design phase. Once the equipment is in place, it must be
rigorously installed and tested to ensure that performance meets specifications,
and that network operations are not adversely affected. Once the system is
assured of matching the requirements detailed in the security policy, then the
system moves out into the production
environment." 12
The above comments make a very keen and interesting observation when it
points out that most organizations already have a deployment method in place that can
be utilize for the deployment of security policy or architecture. It is also true that since
this is a routine that probably has been repeated numerous times and may be
somewhat perfected that many organizations choose to simply employ this function and
forego the initial assessments and planning that is critical to the success of any security
policy or architecture.
Those organizations that have embarked upon a security life cycle path will have
abandoned these efforts if the prescribed steps and methods are not thoroughly
followed during deployment efforts, as well as all the other phases
of the life cycle.
Additionally, removing or inserting procedures into a designated life
cycle could
increase the chances of failure as new components may offset the original design and
its intent. The above comments are absolutely correct in placing extreme importance
on the management of security and the
realization that security is not just about
12
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technology, but process and a continual effort to negate or manage risk within the
subject environment.
The statements above also reflect the need for educational efforts within
organizations on matters of security. It is unrealistic to expect an entire enterprise to
adhere to the regulations of a security policy if they are not made to understand its
details and what is permitted and what is not. It is also important to make employees,
business partners, customers, and possibly competitors aware of the consequences of
violating the security policy. Without repercussions the policy is certain to be ignored
and frequently defiled.
The placing of stones! The implementation of security policy and architectures is
an extremely vital function within a security life cycle and some may even consider it the
most important aspect. It is one that must be given the utmost attention and
consideration for deployment if success is to be achieved. The cornerstones of security
must be carefully placed and managed in order to be effective. Properly employing
these components within eBusiness environments adds an additional difficulty to the
task. This is so because of the dynamic nature and the unique requirements that exist
for eBusiness initiatives. The implementation phase of any security effort is a very
sensitive task that should be given extreme attention and resources dedicated to, as it
will play a role in every other phase of security life cycles and must be considered from
assessment to process management stages.
Romancing the Stones
"Computer insecurity is inevitable. Technology can foil most of the casual
attackers. Laws can deter, or at least prosecute, most criminals. But attacks will
fall through the cracks. Networks will be hacked. Fraud will be committed.
Money will be lost. People will die.
Technology alone cannot save us. Products have problems, and they are
getting worse. The only thing reasonable to do is
to create processes that accept
this reality, and allow us to go about our lives the best we
can. It's no different
from any other aspect of our
society. No technological security measures can
protect us from terrorist attacks. We use products as best as we can, and
implement processes-security checkpoints at borders,
intelligence gathering on




The comments above are an absolute truth; technology is certainly
not the
golden solution for all security threats and
related issues. Even the strongest of
security architectures employing
state of the art, cutting edge technology are not
immune to penetration and the compromising of
protected assets. No vendor of
security products can





It is simply not possible with new attacks and methods of exploiting vulnerabilities
being created daily it is an extreme task just to keep up with these exploits as
they are created and evolve into new threats.
However, there is a viable solution to the problem that must be employed
to succeed where products and technologies fail. This component of a security
architecture is the processes and procedures that are practiced daily in order to
ensure that systems are secured and that the mechanisms used to protect them
are functioning properly. Without these measure an infrastructure is just as
insecure as it was before particular products were deployed for security, because
these products must be managed.
These processes are the romancing of the previously placed stones or
cornerstones of security that solidify the technical aspects of a security
architecture. Simply inserting technology into an environment and expecting it to
function without flaw or monitoring is highly unrealistic, but many organizations
frequently practice this inappropriate activity without any regards to the
consequences. Though, many security products are extremely robust and
effective they still require extra attention in order to perform to the best of their
abilities.
The case of security within eBusiness environments is similar to that of
physical security concerns. An organization would never implement surveillance
cameras, but never monitor them just as security mechanisms for Internet, LAN,
WAN, etc. should never be employed and completely forgotten about. It is very
important for organizations to thoroughly monitor logs and aggressively watch
traffic entering and leaving their networks. These efforts must be conducted daily
and possibly several times a day in order to maintain a secure state of operation.
Often times many enterprises neglect to actively address these issues and
in-
turn the owners of these networks have absolutely no idea who or what is
traversing them.
These daily operational activities could possibly be viewed by some as the
most important aspect of securing an infrastructure or network. It is these
tiresome tasks that keep a network up and running securely in the midst of
literally thousands upon thousands of threats that are present each
day. The
following sections will address the day to day efforts involved
in securing
eBusiness architectures after the policy, systems, and infrastructures have been
implemented and are functioning within a production environment. These tasks
as expressed above are extremely important and
should not be taken lightly,
Processes and procedures for security should be a corporate wide
initiative and effort in protecting networks and
assets from the inevitable.
Companies that are lax on these daily activities have either already suffered
some recourse or it is destined to come. The fact is that security
architectures
are meant to be managed and administered. Deploying security
solutions and
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leaving them to manage themselves is highly unacceptable. The following
sections will further illustrate this fact, as well as state the importance of security
processes within an organization.
"Operate Phase
The Operate phase of PFIRES occurs on a daily basis. Its purpose is to monitor
the controls that have been put in place to secure the organization and handle




The purpose of this step is to define the daily activities throughout the
organization to ensure that the security policy is enforced across the security
infrastructure. These activities can be broken into a few general categories:
Administration
and Operations
Administer anti-virus software, common
operating environment and workstation.
configuration policies, user accounts and
access rules, operating systems, firewalls,.
remote dial-up access, backups
Security Services Support teams and projects in the appropriate
implenMntation of the security policy
Communication Distribute alerts, deliver awareness program,
provide security training
Investigation Investigate intrusions, frauds &nd errors
Compliances Perform system audits and reviews, perform
Intrusion detection and penetration testing,
perform user activity audit trail analysis;
ensure compliance with internal standards and
external regulations
Scope
There tends to be overlap between Monitor Operations and Review Trends and
Manage Events, and the steps are not necessarily sequential. Often the
organization will continue to operate normally while a team is investigating a
particular event, which may necessitate a security policy change. Therefore the
entrance and exit criteria for these steps are not as clear as for other steps.
Basically, Monitor Operations concerns planned activities necessary to support
the security infrastructure and policy while Review Trends and Manage Events
focuses on unplanned
events." 1
The Operate phase of the PFIRES model like most security frameworks is where
the majority of the day to day work occurs. It is during this phase and the efforts
exhausted within that the strength of enterprise security policies, security architectures,
and overall strategies are truly tested and made to exhibit their worth. Security policies
and architectures functioning within production or operational environments must
withstand the scars, bruises, and often fatalities associated with protecting the perimeter
and interior of eBusiness networks and corporate infrastructures as well. Long after a
1
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security policy has been created and an architecture designed and deployed to support
that policy vigorous efforts must be made to ensure that the fielded solution remains
viable and as strong as it was first conceived to be. The only way to guarantee this
strength is through relentless process and adherence to the policies that are governing
networks, infrastructures, and organizations.
The general categories described in the monitor operations step above are a
small sample of the tasks that must be conducted daily within the trenches of an
enterprise to maintain secure operating states and not have vulnerabilities exploited.
Daily administration of systems and networks are tasks that will have been in effect long
before security policies are developed or security architectures are designed or
employed. Considering this many organizations actively introduce new security
initiatives into their respective environments, but automatically assume that the
administration requirements will continue to be met by the resources and measures
already in place.
This train of thought can quite easily lead to the downfall of viable security
solutions. New policies and architectures will naturally be accompanied by new
administration and management requirements that must be thoroughly investigated and
provided for. Means of complying with security policies must be examined and the best
alternatives selected. Ensuring that the daily security and network operations of a
corporation are in tact and coincide with policy and strategic business initiatives is not
only a necessity, but can prove to be extremely beneficial to the flow of business
operations, especially within eBusiness realms.
"Step Methodology
This step is unique because it is not clearly executed through a series of
sub-
steps. Monitor Operations consists of several simultaneous activities, which must











It should be noted that PFIRES does not address specific steps to support a
security infrastructure or monitor a system; it is intended to address how a
security policy should be used to drive the overall security efforts of an
organization.
It is important to have a clearly defined role for each security
administration/operation function. This role description should delineate the
scope of responsibilities, performance measurement criteria, and required skills.
It is also important that the individual in the role be given an appropriate amount
of time and training to execute the role and maintain skills.
In today's highly networked environment, the most diligent administrator is just as
vulnerable as the most negligent. Therefore, it is also vital to have clearly defined
procedures and processes for administration tasks, especially in a distributed
environment where multiple people across an organization will be performing the
same function for different user
groups." 1
The above comments point out an interesting fact that in-depth training is
essential to security administrators performing their jobs. This is especially true when
new security mechanisms and controls are introduced to support a new or updated
security policy. Training should also be provided to the end users of systems and
architectures in order to ensure that they are completely informed on what is required to
adhere to security policies and how exactly their daily routines must change or improve
to support security initiatives.
Without proper training administrators and users alike are left to make
assumptions on how to accurately utilize security tools as well as system and
infrastructure components which eventually lead to new vulnerabilities and risks arising.
The training or information sessions on policy should also clearly define the possible
repercussions of security violations and failure to adhere to policy. This will provide
all
with the realization that the company or organization is very serious about the security
of its assets and overall environment.
The following comments provide insight into the assurance and confidence
in
security efforts. These efforts include
the entire gambit of steps taken to secure
environments, assets, employees, etc. Once any security
framework or model has
been successfully implemented and is
operational both owning organizations and
customers alike must feel extremely comfortable with the security solution. For
eBusiness this is an extremely vital aspect of
success.
Since most if not all business is conducted via the Internet it must be ensured
that the security provided for both
corporation and consumer is adequate and
appropriate. If this assurance is not given then not only will business suffer, but the
lively hood of both parties may be deteriorated
as insecurity can lead to exploits that
can be unimaginable and totally unacceptable by anyone. This can often mean putting
1
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someone's life savings, personal information, or character damaging data on the line for
adversaries or event he world to see.
"Assurance
Assurance is defined as the degree of confidence that security needs are
satisfied [NIST94a]. It is a very important product of security engineering. There
are many forms of assurance. The SSE-CMM contributes to one aspect, the
confidence in the repeatability of the results from the security engineering
process. The basis for this confidence is that a mature organization is more likely
to repeat results than an immature organization. The detailed relationship
between different forms of assurance is the subject of ongoing research.
Assurance does not add any additional controls to counter risks related to
security, but it does provide the confidence that the controls that have been












Assurance can also be viewed as the confidence that the safeguards will function
as intended. This confidence derives from the properties of correctness and
effectiveness. Correctness is the property that the safeguards, as designed,
implement the requirements. Effectiveness is the property that the safeguards
provide security adequate to meet the customer's security needs. The strength of
the mechanism also plays a part but is moderated by the level of protection and
assurance being sought.
Assurance is often communicated in the form of an argument. The argument
includes a set of claims about properties of the system. These claims are
supported by evidence. The evidence is frequently in the form of documentation
developed during the normal course of security engineering activities.
The SSE-CMM activities themselves involve the production of assurance
relevant evidence. For example, process documentation can indicate that the
development has followed a well-defined and mature engineering process that is
subject to continuous improvement. Security verification and validation play a
large role in establishing the trustworthiness of a product or system.
Many of the example work products included within the process areas will
contribute to, or form part of that evidence. Modern statistical process control
suggests that higher quality and higher assurance products can be produced
more cost effectively and repeatedly by focusing on the process used to produce
them. The maturity of the organizational practices will influence and contribute to
the
process." 13
The previous comments appropriately describe assurance within security
engineering and applying the same assurance measures and techniques to fielded
solutions. The concept of assurance is extremely valuable for enterprises in their
security efforts. This value exists in all phases of a security framework. From
requirements and risk analysis, policy development and deployment, and architectural
design and fielding appropriate levels of assurance must be obtained by all involved that
the overall solution will be successful. Even more important is the assurance in the
policy and architecture that they will be able to withstand inevitable
attack and attempts
of penetration.
Providing assurance is a consideration and should be a requirement introduced
at the beginning of security policy and architectural work. It is a theme that should be
centralized and made to flow over into every phase or step of a security framework.
The assurance that is expected in the end result of security development and
deployment is the same expectation that should be applied initially and continuously
built upon and made to be reflected in every aspect of security programs. Without this
assurance success can never really be expected, because there is no established trust
in the security of a system or
architecture. Without assurance failure is not a matter of
13
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if, but when and this doubt is certainly not desired by customers or providers and must
be combated.
The next section introduces additional thoughts on the management and support
of security architectures and deployed policies. It continues to reflect the importance of
the daily actions involved in securing domains and infrastructures. It delves deeper into
the heart of the battle being fought by security professionals on the front lines of
network perimeters as well as within the interior of organizations.
The following comments will describe the importance of electing either to
manage security tasks with in-house personnel or outsourcing the responsibilities. This
is a very important decision, as organizations that are not properly staffed or possess
the skill sets to adequately manage security within should not try to fool themselves and
make believe that it will be alright. The decision to outsource or staff internally is always
one that must be given tremendous thought and consideration, because both come with
risk that may not be acceptable now or ever depending on the situation. Additionally,
some of the associated risks for both may not be manageable or even possible to
mitigate. Thus creating unique situations that must be addressed thoroughly and with
extreme caution.
"Management and Support
Management and support take multiple forms. On one level, it is the process by
which the success of the security can be measured. Are corporate assets
adequately protected? Is the online environment and supply chain sufficiently
transparent? Are users comfortable with the level of security, or are there active
attempts to subvert an overly restrictive system? Has the enterprise environment
evolved sufficiently to require a reassessment of the security policy? These may
be generalized questions, but a security policy with tightly defined, data-driven
parameters for measuring performance will have no trouble delivering immediate
answers.
On a more technical level, the security policy dictates how security is supported
once the deployment stage is complete. Since management requirements and
user needs have been converted into a data-driven set of implementation and
configuration guidelines, it is very possible to create a system that learns to
manage itself, including escalation procedures. In this environment, security
information is correlated and analyzed so that human resources can concentrate
on "hot
spots"
that require immediate, non-standard attention.
There are two paths for proper security management and support. The first uses
in-house staff and applications to monitor the network for attack and/or misuse,
plus periodically test the network for
vulnerabilities and non-compliance with
security policy. This cycle of
continuous security improvement works as follows:
Security assessment and intrusion
detection applications routinely watch the
network for signs of improper activity or policy non-compliance. Since these
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applications look only for signs of attack, misuse and misconfiguration that match
specific security policy profiles, they minimize their impact on network
performance and significantly reduce the event-driven data that must be
analyzed as part of the reporting process.
If a security event does occur that indicates a violation of security policy, these
applications respond according to predefined rules for action. Relatively
insignificant violations can be dealt with automatically. More serious situations
trigger email, pager or FAX notification of appropriate staff. Extreme situations
alert senior security staff, with continuing escalation until the crisis has been
resolved. Enterprise-level reporting tools quickly correlate and analyze emerging
situations, enabling staff to concentrate attention where
it'
s needed most.
Finally, these applications use the security policy to reconfigure the network
itself in response to attack. Once an intrusion is detected, the system launches
security assessment scans against other segments of the enterprise. If other
hosts, databases or devices vulnerable to that type of attack are located; they
can be reconfigured to block misuse until the situation is under control. If the
attack or misuse is outside the security policy, then administrators are alerted, so
that the assessment process can begin again, closing the security policy process
loop.
Security is one of the most dynamic elements of the IT infrastructure. Unlike the
physical world, automated online security threats do not fatigue, requiring
constant vigilance encompassing every change in an
organization'
s networks.
As a result, many companies are turning to managed security services to provide
a cost-effective alternative to in-house security policy management and support.
For many organizations, the cost of hiring, training and supporting an in-house
network security staff more than outweighs the perceived advantages of having
localized control over security operations. Outsourcing provides efficient and
effective information protection. Management overhead and liability exposure
become shared with and diluted through the managed services vendor. More
importantly, organizations can use managed security services to unlock IT
resources for other needs while ensuring networks are globally secure 24x7, 365
days a year.
Managed security services usually consist of a multiple of offerings from
best-of-
breed vendors. This broad menu of offerings allows organizations to select the
range of services that best fit their needs. Recommended offerings should
include:
Firewall and router management
Intrusion detection and response
Virtual private networking (VPN)
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Access control, authentication and encryption
Virus and vandal protection
Web site filtering
Security policy consulting, creation and management
Software update/patch services
Configuration backup/restoration
Security reports for authorized managers via hardcopy and Web browser
24x7 security monitoring and phone support
In the end, the choice of in-house versus outsourced managed security services
comes down to budget, corporate culture and business strategy. Regardless of
which path an organization takes, proper use of globally security policy will
deliver an appropriate level of
protection." 12
The previous comments clearly explain the importance of managing and
adequately supporting security measures and programs. While creating a security
policy and developing a strong architecture to secure networks for eBusiness and
traditional corporate initiatives is extremely difficult and require tremendous thought and
concentration, the act of managing these policies and architectures tend to be more
tedious than is usually expected. Additionally, providing an appropriate support
structure for the personnel and mechanisms utilized in the management of security
architectures is equally important. This is simply because continuing the operation of a
secure environment regardless of its nature is not feasible with only one resource
assigned or one management tool associated.
The above comments also do an excellent job in describing the areas that must
be covered by a strong security management and support initiative. Although a wide
variety of areas are covered this will be a unique
situation for differing environments, as
each environment will be designed, implemented, and managed differently. However,
these differences do not eliminate the basis for management, which requires consistent,
vigilant processes for the daily management of security infrastructures.
Without these well thought out, tried and true processes organizations will never
truly know if their infrastructure is secured from day to
day. These processes must
become as routine as individual network users logging onto the LAN everyday, because
new attack methods and vulnerabilities within security architecture will and do arise
daily. Therefore, the only way to combat them is to not
let them get out of control or the
upper hand. Making the first move often means winning
the battle or not.
12
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The passage makes an excellent effort in describing the ultimate choice that
organizations have in choosing to either staff security management in-house or
outsource the efforts. This decision can be as vital to success as the design choices
that are made when creating a security architecture. The decision process should be
conducted in a similar fashion as the entire security life cycle. Thorough assessments
and analysis should be conducted on the existing in-house resources to determine if the
appropriate skill sets exist.
Evaluations of potential outsourced solutions must be thoroughly conducted as
well. There now exists many outsourced managed security providers within the
information security industry. For different companies with different objectives all of
these may be a possible contender or possess a viable solution to their security needs.
Therefore it is extremely important that all appropriate providers be considered. To
simply select one or the other without the necessary research could be even more
riskier than not having a solution at all, and could possibly introduce additional risk and
threats by their presence.
Another alternative is not to hand over all the keys to the corporate palace, but
simply outsource those areas that are not being adequately addressed within the
enterprise. This also will vary for different companies and their overall objectives for
security and securing their respective infrastructures. The outsourcing or employing of
a provider to supply 24 x 7 monitoring of an enterprise's networks is highly suggested
and can be beneficial within any environment.
The fact is regardless of what type of traffic is traversing a particular network in
today's Internet space and networked world there always exists a threat to these
networks and these threats usually strike when least expected. It is also usually not
feasible or fair to expect employees to monitor network activity on a constant basis.
This is why the business space for security and network monitoring has become a
valuable asset to posses within corporate structures. This also eliminates some of the
worries and pressure incurred by network administrators who work hard to keep the
network up and flowing daily, as well as the security engineers who protect the
infrastructure from nine to five.
The quotes also list reasonable areas that a managed security firm should cover
and the options an organization should be able to select from. However, it may be the
case that in some situations a firm that only specializes in a particular area of security
may be the better choice for a company. This could eliminate a tremendous amount of
risk involved with companies who offer a broad variety of services, but does not
specialize in one particular area. Firms that claim to do it all may be an incident waiting
to happen. Or could be technically savvy and capable of meeting all of an organizations
needs, but is unable to manage the tasks in which they are responsible for.
Management within managed security services firms is also a very important
requirement, because although the majority of the work will be strictly technical it is still
a business that is being run. Ensuring that the firm is capable of conducting and
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managing its own business will make conducting business with them more enjoyable. It
could also possibly assist in making sure the job is being well done and the
infrastructure on contract is protected and not vulnerable to the daily attacks and threats
that exist.
"We're also seeing a more intimate service: Managed Security Monitoring.
Someone has to monitor security products in real time and respond to events as they
occur. They (a single person won't be there 24 hours) have to be versed in attackers
and their tools. They have to be able to maintain the security products in the face of
ever-changing networks and ever-changing services running on those networks.
Companies just can't do this themselves. They're in the business of making cars,
selling books, or doing whatever, not of securing their networks. Just as they
outsourced the management of their networks to an ISP and the hosting of theirWeb
sites to an ASP, they will outsource the security of their network to a company that
specializes in
that."
Bruce Schneier does an excellent job in the comment above to describe the need
for managed security services and outsourcing those requirements. As was mentioned
before managing daily security operations is a difficult and highly critical task that must
be handled by trained skilled professionals. These professionals must often times think
like a hacker or cracker in order to retaliate against or anticipate the next move of an
attacker.
This type of service is rapidly growing and as the threats increase within and on
networks the popularity of managed security services will continue to expand.
Organizations should take an in-depth look at this functionality and truly consider it as a
viable solution to many, but not all of their security woes. To simply let vulnerabilities
and incompleteness abound within a security framework is simply not acceptable in the
networked economy. Businesses are literally losing thousands and possibly millions of
dollars a day because of these lacking processes that could easily be handled by a
professional firm.
The next section will continue to build upon Schneier's thoughts on security
processes and procedures. The section will introduce several important factors in
creating, applying, and managing processes for security within an enterprise. Bruce
Schneier has practiced these concepts for years and continues to employ them within
his own managed security firm Counterpane Internet Security, Inc. These processes
should definitely be thoroughly evaluated and applied to the appropriate areas of an
organization in order to effectively create processes to manage security.
Procedures and processes as stated earlier should be a vital component of the
security framework of any and all
organizations. Simply employing technology and
technological expertise is not enough and will eventually fail where meticulous process
will prevail. However, incorporating procedures and processes is not a simple task
either it must be carefully planned and conducted




given to the business flows that it might and often times will affect. For, as security is
the ultimate objective it is necessary to remember that business needs prevail, because
without a business there is nothing to protect.
"Principles
Compartmentalize
Compartmentalization is smart security, because it limits the damage from
a successful attack. It's common sense, and there are lots of examples: Users get
individual accounts, office doors are locked with different keys, access is based on
clearance plus need to know, individual files are encrypted with unique keys. Security is
not all-or-nothing; security breaches should not be, either.... Compartmentalization is
also important because a system's security degrades in proportion to its use. The
larger, more popular, more integral a computer is, the less secure it is. This is one
reason why the Intemet-the most widely used network ever-is so insecure. A computer
powered down, in a locked bomb shelter, and surrounded by guards, is more secure
than aWeb server is. Compartmentalization moves systems closer to the
former." 10
The previous statements are a simple fact of not only security concerns but also
life in general. The more measures taken to secure anything the more secure it will be.
Organizations in the past have experienced a high level of security breaches and loss or
damage to assets simply because they relied on only one means of protection. After
the firewall was penetrated an attacker had free range of the network, or after a
password was broken all data on a computer was accessible and readable. These
mishaps are definitely preventable and certainly unacceptable. Employing
compartmentalization further ensures that once not if a security breach occurs it does
not mean that all is lost simply because your company relied on another companies
product or word.
"Secure theWeakest Link
The best place to direct countermeasures is at the weakest link. This is
obvious, but again and again I see systems that ignore it. You can't just plant a mile
high pole in front of your castle and hope the enemy runs right into it, you have to look
at the whole landscape and build earthworks and a palisade. Similarly, just because
you're using an encryption algorithm with a 256-bit key doesn't mean you're secure; the
enemy is likely to find some avenue of attack that ignores the encryption algorithm
completely... Look at the entire vulnerability landscape, create an attack tree: find the
weakest link and secure it. Then worry about the next weakest link. You'll end up with
a much more secure system that way.
" 10
The weakest link; a factor of every security strategy and system that can not be
ignored. This or possibly these weakest links should be
flushed out during the
assessment phases at the beginning of a security life cycle. Once discovered worked
should be continually exerted until it is no




to be managed properly. Additionally, as stated above once this weak link has been
properly address organizations must move onto the next and the next and the next, until
all vulnerabilities have been covered.
"Use Choke Points
A choke point forces users into a narrow channel, one that you can more
easily monitor and control. Think of turnstiles at a train station, checkout lanes at a
supermarket, and doors to your house. Think of firewalls, routers, login screens, and
Web sites that force you to go to the homepage first.... Choke points only work if there's
is no way to get around them. One of the common ways to defeat a firewall is to go
around it: find an unsecured dial-up connection into the network, for example... This
both violates the choke points, and means that the network has a new weakest link that
needs
securing." 10
Within all networks we see choke points being utilized daily. However, these
choke points can often be configured improperly or permit traffic to traverse the network
via secondary means. The configuring of firewalls, routers, proxies, content filters, etc.
should be viewed as a vital part of a security architecture and life cycle. Simply
employing these controls and mechanisms is never enough, because if not properly
configured they are useless. For example, what good is a firewall that permits all
incoming and outbound traffic or a router that permits all protocols from any host? The
purpose is completely defeated if proper configuration is not applied. This often is not a
simple task as configuring these choke points must restrict traffic but not interfere with
daily business flow. Though difficult absolutely necessary!
"Provide Defense in Depth
Defense in depth is another universal security principle that applies to
computers just as it applies to everything else.
A good perimeter defense-door locks and window alarms-is more effective
when combined with motion sensors inside the house... A firewall, combined with an
intrusion detection system and strong cryptography protecting the applications, is more
secure than a firewall alone...The security of several security countermeasures
depends on the easiest way to default all those countermeasures: defense in
depth." 10
Defense in depth is similar to compartmentalization. Security should be applied
in layers and each layer of a security architecture should complement or strengthen the
weakest link of the layer below and above. This is a tried and true methodology that
when practiced and maintained will usually result in systems that are more difficult to
penetrate. Defense in depth should be considered when evaluating or implementing
portions of a security framework. All of the
components should work in conjunction to
provide a sophisticated web of security that is strengthened not degraded by new
controls being applied or additional configuration being
implemented. It is extremely




model, because it is crucial that the security of a system or infrastructure be constantly
built up and assurance in that security solution be increased.
"Fail Securely
Many systems have a property that I call default to insecure. This means
that if the system fails, then the user reverts to a less-secure backup system... This
cavalier approach to security is pervasive, and it's the reason denial-of-service attacks
can become invasive attacks... Few people have the discipline not to communicate if
they cannot communicate securely. Even the military, which you think would take this
seriously, has screwed this up again and again... The same principle is used in safety
engineering, and is called fail safe. If a microprocessor in an automobile fails, you don't
want it failing by forcing maximum throttle. If a nuclear missile fails, you don't want it
failing by launching. Fail-safe is a good design
principle." 10
Systems and components of systems are bound to fail, whether it is due to an
attack, a simple malfunction, or defective products. The key is to ensure that these
failures result in failing to a safe or secure mode. Naturally this mode will not be as safe
as regular operating mode, but it should guarantee that the front door to a network or
enterprise is not left wide open for all to enter or manipulate. When building security
systems architects and engineers often forget to include this functionality or ensure that
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) products guarantee fail over to a secure mode. This
must be given more attention, because as mentioned above if not properly handled
Denial-of Service attacks as well as others can escalate from an availability attack to the
theft or tampering of vital corporate data and applications.
"Embrace simplicity
Complexity is the worst enemy of security. A system is only as secure as
the weakest link, so a system with fewer links is easier to secure. Complex systems are
less secure than simple ones,
guaranteed." 10
Simplicity within security can truly be a virtue. This is especially true when trying
to secure systems that are vital to the livelihood of an organization. If security
professionals are not faced with a great deal of complexity it is easier to secure the
system and not interrupt the flow of business.
Though this is a good principle to always keep in mind it is often not the choice of
the security engineer as to how simple
or complex a system is. He or she is forced o
work with what it present. However, it is important not to increase complexity by
applying more complex tools and products,
and also methodologies on top of an already
difficult situation. If possible the engineer or security professional should attempt to
remove complexity or simplify the security
components of the system in whatever
manner possible. If this is not possible the security personnel must ensure
that he or






Security is a lot easier if you assume trusted and intelligent users, and a
lot harder if you assume malicious and ignorant users. Security measures that aren't
understood and agreed to by everyone don't work. Remember that the hardest security
problems to solve are the ones that involve people; the easiest are the ones that involve
bits." 10
People and the functions that depend on people to operate usually are the
weakest link within a security solution. This is due to many factors: malice, mistake,
carelessness, lack of understanding, etc. This weak link is exactly why training is so
important for users, administrators, and owners of systems. This is one of the few ways
of ensuring that the security measures put in place for a system or infrastructure are
being adhered to and utilized in a proper manner. Investing in the education of
employees on matters concerning security can be trivial compared to the damage and
loss to be suffered by security breaches and system downtime caused by system
misuse or employee negligence.
"Assure
What we really need is assurance: assurance that our systems work
properly, that they possess the properties we want and only those properties. Most
attacks in the real world result in failures of assurance-the products doing something
unintended-rather than function: the products failing to do what they were intended to
do."10
The importance of assurance was discussed earlier in the document, but is
further substantiated by the comments above. Assurance is a very difficult quality and
feature to obtain and maintain. However, it is an aspect of eBusiness that must be
present in order for any organization to be successful. If customers, partners, and
suppliers are not given assurance that the business processes and security concerns
are being well taken care of they will inevitable take their business somewhere else.
"Detection and Response
Detect Attacks
On the Internet, detection can be a lot of work. It's not enough to put up a
firewall and be done with it; you need to detect attacks against the network. This means
reading, understanding, and interpreting the reams of audit logs that the firewall
produces. This means reading, understanding, and interpreting the reams of logs that
the routers, servers, and other devices on the
networks produce-we have to assume
that some attacks will bypass the firewall. These bypass attacks always leave footprints





The detection of attacks can be one of the most tedious jobs of a security
professional. Even with the aid of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) the monitoring of
logs and other audit files and trails must be consistent and aggressively conducted
daily. Even during the daily audits logs should be reviewed several times during a day
as something may have been overlooked or new to the logs. If these files are not
continuously monitored and review one will never know. So when organizations
claimed to never have been breached the question should be asked when is the last
time you check your log files and conducted audit trails. It is guaranteed that the
statement will be retracted upon further review.
"Analyze Attacks
Simple detection isn't enough; you need to understand the attack and
what it means. Traditionally, the military breaks the process down into four generic
steps:
Detection - Perceiving that your under attack
Localization - Determining where the attack is
Identification - Determining who the attacker is and where he is working from.
Assessment - Understanding the attacker, his strategy and tactics, his
capabilities, and maybe even his vulnerabilities
Each of these steps is more difficult than the previous one, and each
requires more detailed information and expertise of analysis. And often this
analysis requires human expertise; a computer alone is going to fail sooner or
later (although an automatic program may do a pretty good job most of the
time)."10
The procedure above provides a high level overview of the tasks involved with
analyzing attacks. Most organizations react to attacks in panic or hasty, impulsive
actions. The act of analysis often never occurs, or occurs much later when additional
damage has been caused by drastic, unnecessary actions. A well thought out plan for
investigating attacks and possible attacks will serve as a key process for combating
security breaches and attacks. These simply concepts combined with detailed
procedures could save an organization a great deal of headaches.
"Respond to Attacks
Response is complicated, and often involves intelligent people making
split-second decisions without a lot of time to fully think thing through... That's only one
half of response: making the problem go away. Equally important is the other half:





Response to attacks is a very sensitive and highly critical issue within security
architectures. Regardless of how secure a system or infrastructure is attack is
inevitable. The manner in which an attack is responded to is a crucial component of
security strategy. As stated above, simply fixing the problem whether it is patching a
hole or vulnerability, introducing new products, restricting the usage of certain
applications, etc. unless the root of the problem is discovered and uprooted the
incidents will continue.
"Counterattack
One solution is to go on the offensive. We don't fight crime by making our
banks 100 percent immune to attack; we fight crime by catching criminals.... If the
United States was ever the target of a nuclear attack by the USSR, the planned
response was to counterattack. Mutual assured destruction is about as surreal as
security defense gets, but it
worked."10
Counterattack measures are certainly a viable alternative in securing ones
perimeter and internal confines. Simply protecting and remaining docile often times is
not sufficient in thwarting attackers. Security professionals are beginning to realize that
adversaries value their networks and computing resources as much as they do and are
not to keen on the idea of being hacked themselves. Additionally, most attacks
breaches and attempts to breach are usually orchestrated by unprofessional hackers or
script-kiddies that don't really know what they are doing.
These adversaries can become an extreme nuisance if not properly dealt with.
New methods of combating these problems are coming about, from reverse hacking to
honeypot schemes no security architecture or guardians of that architecture should feel
at the mercy of attackers, but empowered to retaliate. It definitely is all out war on a
new battle field and the battle, as well as the war will be lost if all sit ideally by and do
nothing.
"Manage Risk
After you've identified a risk, you can do one of three things with it: You
can accept it, you can reduce it, or you can insure yourself against it. Security does not
have to be perfect, but the risks have to be manageable... Risk management is the
future of digital
security." 10
The above comments hit the nail directly on the head. There is no such thing as
a perfect or unpenetrable security architecture or overall solution. Regardless of how
advanced the technology utilized or the structure of processes and procedures
implemented security breaches are inevitable. The key to security is definitely
in
identifying risk and taking appropriate actions against those
risks. As stated above
once a risk or risks have been identified they can be accepted, reduced or mitigated, or




work vigorously to manage them regardless of the actions an organization chooses to
take.
Many organizations create dangerous situations for themselves when
approaching the risk within their respective environments. These risks are often taken
lightly and products thrown at them that do not completely handle the job. Or even
worst they are simply ignored and left to grow and increase in possible detriment to an
environment. It is important for these enterprises to understand choosing to accept a
risk does not automatically imply ignoring it. These issues must still be actively
monitored and managed as to ensure that accepting the risk does not inherently mean
suffering the consequences associated with it.
Conclusions
"eBusiness without security is not an option. Security will inevitably cost a lot of
money, but a skillful approach can minimize the cost. It may restrict the way business
processes operate, but one of the main objectives of the security specialist has to be to
reduce these restrictions to the absolute minimum. The issue is getting the right
balance, the one that is most appropriate for the
business." 21
The first sentence of the above passage is a comment that should be
reverberated to every organization participating in or anticipating eBusiness activities. It
is certainly true that eBusiness without security is definitely not an option. It should not
even be contemplated without concerns for security being discussed up front and
openly.
However, the past and present has shown the industry taking contradictory
actions to meeting the vital requirements of security for eBusiness initiatives. Security
has been and remains an issue, but until recently has not received the necessary and
important attention and considerations that it warrants. Many firms have elected to
address security at the end of development or systems integration. This does not allow
for the in-depth efforts that must be asserted in order to achieve success.
Even more detrimental to the success of eBusiness has been the reliance solely
on security based products and technologies to provide solutions to security related
issues. When these products and technologies themselves are compromised or proven
not to be the expected silver bullet of security companies are left vulnerable and must
start from scratch to address the needs of the corporations security.
As stated earlier this thesis proposes that in order to design security solutions
and architect sound security infrastructures a life cycle
approach must be adapted and
actively pursued. Security like many other areas of IT is a continuous process that
involves daily activities that can not be ignored or taken
lightly. Although, many of the
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efforts can be automated there still exist a requirement for intensive monitoring of
security systems in order to properly manage security.
There are several cornerstones that exist within secure eBusiness and security in
general and all are extremely important in and of themselves. However, the underlying
foundation for even these cornerstones is a strong effective security policy. The
security policy is designed to provide interoperability among these cornerstones and to
govern and enforce the proper usage of tools and devices associated with each.
Additionally, the policy will establish repercussions for breaking the inherent rules and
regulations that it possesses.
Many organizations look to technology as the deciding factor in their security
solutions and architectures, but securing an enterprise especially one that participates
in eBusiness requires much, much more. Companies must begin to realize that security
is absolutely a process not a product. This process encompasses technology, people,
roles, responsibilities, geographic concerns, policies, standards, etc. There is an
abundance of issues to consider when seeking a strong, stable security solution and the
technology involved is only one area of concern.
"Security is going to get worse before it gets better, because of human nature -
the human nature of those who design, write, deploy, use and abuse the systems, and
even that of the people who guard the
systems." 22
Oh, how true the previous statements are! Humans are naturally prone to error,
and within IT is no exception. These human errors eventually and sometimes
immediately lead to vulnerabilities and additional risks in systems and infrastructures
that can and will be exploited. The recent increase in security related events are
evidence of the problem getting worse.
Not a day goes by that security breaches and incidents are not reported and that
money and time is lost because of these mishaps. Sadly the root of the problem is one
that has been created by those who are trying to combat it. Years and years of placing
security concerns on the back burner has finally come to a head and the problem can
no longer be ignored. Constant advances in technology make it even more difficult to
manage. As organizations embrace new technologies and utilize them more frequently
the associated risks involved continue to grow. Adversaries now realize that with each
new technology there is a new back door into an enterprises fortress, it is simply a
matter of picking the lock.
Corporations and individuals alike must become more aggressive in combating
these security issues. The problem has
gotten and continues to worsen, but no one can
sit idly by and continue to let business critical systems and
initiatives be compromised.
The concerns for security reach far beyond the
corporate confines, as technology is a
center of many lifestyles now. Malicious
disruption of these technologies can prove to




Spafford of Purdue University
97
Information warfare can and will begin to extend past the pentagon and into
hospitals that are becoming more and more technology dependent as well as, into
utilities companies and other components of a nation's infrastructure. These threats
already exist and must begin to be prepared for. To wait until a true catastrophe occurs
may be too late for many. Additionally, these threats and risks can not simply be
combated with more technology as in some ways technology is a partial cause of the
problem. To sugar coat it with more technology will only make the problem worse not
eliminate it.
In summary security can no longer be ignored or taken lightly. This includes all
forms of security; from securing entrances to buildings to protecting data being
transmitted across the Internet. The stakes have become too high and too much is at
risk to continue to simply accept the loss being incurred as operational costs.
Organizations and individuals alike must truly take security seriously not only for
their own well being but also for others around them. As this digital age continues to
thrive and evolve there must be a sense of responsibility applied to the activities that
occur over digital mediums. All are excited about society becoming an age of the
Jetsons, but we are truly not ready for such a leap into the future. Our current state is
evidence of this as our present technological prowess is proving to be too much.
However, there is still hope, but this hope must be supported by swift and stern actions
to ensure that malice and threat do not prevail in future trends and lifestyles to come.
'There is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of success, nor more
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